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This thesis examines whether the growing U.S.-Indian defense cooperation will serve 
regional peace and security or U.S. interests, particularly if more India means less 
Pakistan in the U.S. defense-cooperation calculus. It also assesses the viability of 
decoupling U.S. security cooperation with India from that with Pakistan. As regards the 
immediate U.S. agenda in the region—a reduced U.S. military footprint and an increased 
Indian military footprint in Afghanistan—the prospects do not appear to be very bright. 
This thesis adopts the comparative approach, commencing with the exploration of 
primary sources. Built on scholarship from all sides of the South Asian question, it 
elucidates the strategic concerns that have shaped U.S. security cooperation in the region 
to date and the ramifications in the near and medium term of the likeliest strategic and 
political decisions to emerge, particularly as the United States shifts gears in Afghanistan 
and other contender powers, including India, orient themselves for the next challenges. 
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I.   U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION WITH INDIA AND 
PAKISTAN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
The recent increase of U.S.-Indian defense cooperation has induced certain 
euphoria in Washington and even in New Delhi, amid dazzling visions of the strategic 
dividends that will accrue to both countries. Some scholars, notably Brian Shoup and 
Sumit Ganguly, maintain that “India’s political and economic maturation necessitates that 
it be detached from Pakistan in the geopolitical calculus of the United States. This need to 
“de-hyphenate” India and Pakistan is essential to India’s wider goals of achieving the 
status of a global power.”1 However, the same feelings are not shared by an important 
stakeholder in the South Asian region—and a long-time ally of the United States—
namely Pakistan. The discrepancy has implications for the region and the United States. 
The rise in India’s military stature will be detrimental to Pakistan’s strategic interests and, 
hence, possibly to long-term peace and security in the region. At the same time, this 
newly reframed relationship may well not achieve U.S. ends in Asia or South Asia. 
India’s limited military involvement in Afghanistan proves this latter point.2  
As such, this thesis examines whether growing U.S.-Indian security cooperation 
will serve regional peace and security or U.S. interests, particularly if more India means 
less Pakistan in the U.S. security cooperation calculus. In the same context, it assesses the 
viability of decoupling U.S. security cooperation with India from that with Pakistan.3 As 
regards the immediate U.S. agenda in the region—a reduced U.S. military footprint and 
an increased Indian military footprint in Afghanistan—the prospects do not appear to be 
very bright. 
                                                 
1 Sumit Ganguly, Brian Shoup and Andrew Scobell eds. U.S.-Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st 
Century: More than Words (New York: Routledge, 2006), 6. 
 2 Sushant K. Singh, “A Bigger Military Presence is Essential,” Pragati: The National Interest Review, 
August 17, 2008, p12 –13. Also see “No Indian Military Role in Afghanistan beyond Training: Leon 
Panetta,” Hindustan Times, June 6, 2012. Available at www.hindustantimes.com/India-
news/NewDelhi/No-Indian-military-role.  
 3 Security and defense cooperation is imbedded in the larger context of strategic relationships. Hence, 
in most of the literature on the subject, the two terms—security and defense cooperation—appear to be 
used interchangeably. This paper, though primarily focused on “Security Cooperation,” will be set against 
the broader strategic background. 
 2 
A. U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA: A BRIEF 
HISTORY 
Within a decade of gaining independence from the British in 1947, India and 
Pakistan became involved in defense cooperation with the United States. From these first 
moments, the differences between South Asia’s two largest powers, refracted through the 
divergent U.S. views of and policies toward India and Pakistan, settled into distinctive 
tracks for strengthening each state’s “defense position,” as contemporary policy classified 
such cooperation.  
Being one of the pioneers of non-aligned movement, India commenced with 
limited military-to-military cooperation in the form of training at U.S. military 
institutions.4 It turned to the United States and other allies to purchase defense equipment 
in the wake of the first Kashmir War and especially after India’s defeat at the hands of 
the Chinese in 1962.5 To Washington’s boundless irritation, the USSR became India’s 
principal supplier of arms upon the conclusion of a bilateral defense agreement in 1971; 
still India continued limited defense cooperation with the United States amid cooler 
relations. In recent years, however, this defense cooperation has witnessed an 
unprecedented growth as the United States seeks additional global strategic partners in 
the post-Cold War order. 
Weak and vulnerable at its independence,6 Pakistan sought allies and secure 
sources of defense equipment to arm its forces. The U.S. urge to check the spread of 
communism in Asia coincided with Pakistan’s security interests, and the new state ended 
up joining the U.S.-led Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and Southeast Asian 
Treaty Organization (SEATO) in the mid-1950s.7 The United States started a steady 
supply of arms to Pakistan, as well, which the latter used to good effect in its 1965 war 
(the second Kashmir War) with India—contrary to Washington’s express stipulation that 
                                                 
4 Jaswant Singh, Defending India (New Delhi: MacMillan India, 1999), 143. 
 5 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Arms Transfer Database,” available from 
www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_db.html. Accessed on January 27, 2013. 
 6 Dominique Lapierre and Larry Collins, Freedom at Midnight (New Delhi: Vikas Press, 1997), 370. 
 7 Stephen Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 64. 
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neither India nor Pakistan would use U.S.-supplied weapons against each other. In the 
wake of the war, the United States imposed sanctions on both India and Pakistan, but 
began to distance itself diplomatically and militarily from Pakistan.8  
Pakistan’s role in “opening” China to the United States in 1971 barely brightened 
this dim view, though the relationship gained prominence, if not warmth, at such crisis 
points as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the initiation of the Global War 
on Terror (GWOT) in 2001. Indeed, the 2010 National Security Strategy mentions 
Pakistan by name on seven pages—six of which identify the country as part of al-Qaeda’s 
home region, while the last page describes U.S. plans to “foster a relationship with 
Pakistan” and to deepen cooperation.9  Both formulations imply that the current 
relationship is underdeveloped.  
B. THE END OR THE BEGINNING? WHAT SOUTH ASIA MEANS 
TO THE UNITED STATES TODAY 
The United States intends to wind down its immediate agenda with respect to the 
GWOT in Afghanistan by 2014.10 This date by no means marks the end of U.S. interest 
or involvement in South Asia, however. The region that is home to India and Pakistan 
boasts of one-fifth of the world’s population.11 A brief survey of South Asia underscores 
its significance to U.S. policy—and global stability and prosperity, well beyond “Project 
Afghanistan.”  To the west of the region is Afghanistan, which has been the hotbed of 
terrorism and consequently, the main battleground for the GWOT. India, the world’s 
largest democracy, is showing impressive economic growth and gaining in stature in 
global trade, to say nothing of its demand for raw material and resources. Pakistan, with a 
                                                 
 8 Seymour M. Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge,” The New Yorker, March 29, 1993. Available at 
www.newyorker.com/. /1993/. /29/1993_03_29_056_TNY_CARD. 
 9 U.S. National Security Strategy 2010, May, 2010, 21. Available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/. /national_security_strategy.pdf. 
 10 Rod Nordland, “Afghan Army’s Turnover Threatens U.S. Strategy,” New York Times, October 15, 
2012. Available at www.nytimes.com/2012/. /afghan-armys-high-turnover-clouds-us-e.   
 11 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book on India and Pakistan, January 2, 2013 and 
January 17, 2013.Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. /in.ht.  and 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. /pk.ht.   
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diverse population of more than 190 million,12 boasts the seventh largest —and also one 
of the most professional military—in the world.  
What’s more, South Asia finds itself in a seriously nuclearized neighborhood, the 
only region on earth with three nuclear neighbors—China, India, and Pakistan. West and 
northwest is resource-rich Central Asia, much of which still struggles to overcome 
decades of Soviet misrule; further still to the west is Iran, which currently is a major 
focus of U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, if Iran makes good on its nuclear ambitions—
turning the nuclear triangle into a rectangle—there will be far-reaching strategic 
implications for regional as well as extra-regional players, including the United States 
and its closest allies. 
Future U.S. strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific, for which Washington needs 
the active support of India, can only be fulfilled if India is willing to oblige. The U.S. 
Asia-Pacific agenda is apparently aimed at containing China, which is also a major player 
in South Asia—and not strictly in the negative sense.13 China is already a strategic 
partner of Pakistan’s and, ironically, a major trading partner of India’s.14 China is the 
main supplier of military hardware and civil nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan.15 
The two-way trade between China and India reached $74 billion in 2011, with China 
becoming one of the largest trade partners of India and vice versa.16 Both countries 
agreed to take steps to ensure that their bilateral trade reaches $100 billion by 2015.17 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
 13 Lisa Curtis, “Going the Extra Mile for a Strategic U.S.-India Relationship,” The Heritage 
Foundation, August 20, 2012. Available at www.heritage.org/. /2012/. /going-the-extra-mile-for-a-
strategic-us-.   
 14 “India-China Trade Hits All Time High of $73.9 Billion in 2011,” NDTV, PTI, January 29, 2012. 
Available at profit.ndtv.com/. /article-india-china-trade-hits-all-time-high-of-73-.  
 15 Dr. Rashid Ahmad Khan, “The Pakistan-China Strategic Partnership,” China.org.cn, May 20, 2011. 
Available at www.china.org.cn › Opinion › Editor’s Pick; Dr. Monica Chansoria, “China’s Arms Sales to 
Pakistan Unsettling South Asian security,” Indian Defense Review, March 14, 2011. Available at 
www.indiandefencereview.com › News › Geopolitics.   
16 Ministry of External Affairs, “India-China Bilateral Relations,” January 9, 2012. Available at 
www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/China-January-2012.pdf. 
 17 Shobhan Saxena, “India-China Bilateral Trade Set to Hit $100 Billion by 2015,” Times of India, 
June 21, 2012.Available at timesofindia.indiatimes.com › Business. 
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Hence China has emerged as “the main strategic partner of Pakistan” and simultaneously 
“the main trading partner of India.”   
This complex matrix of geo-politics, geo-economics, and attendant security 
imperatives make the theme of this study important. The timing of this study is equally 
important because at present, U.S.-Pakistan, U.S.-China, India-China, and India-Pakistan 
relations are all in a state of flux, bilaterally and in relation to all the others. It is an 
unsettled (and often unsettling) strategic situation, to be sure. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES: TIPPING THE NUCLEAR 
TRIANGLE 
Enhanced U.S. interest in the region since 9/11 and the perceived threat from 
China ushered in a strategic partnership between the United States and India. The 
landmark “Civil Nuclear Deal” or “123 Agreement” between the two countries, finalized 
in 2009, came as the first solid proof of their growing relationship. In a way, the 
agreement bestowed upon India de jure status of a nuclear weapon state (NWS) and 
entitled it to enjoy all the perks and privileges that come with this status, albeit with a few 
caveats.18 According to Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan: “India would be eligible to buy 
U.S. dual-use technology ... to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium, potentially 
creating materials for nuclear bombs. It would also receive imported fuel for its nuclear 
reactors.”19  Arguably, this agreement lets India have its yellowcake and eat it, too. 
This upward trend in the U.S.-India defense cooperation, which corresponds with 
a downward trend in U.S.-Pakistan relations, directly feeds into a deep sense of insecurity 
                                                 
 18 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. and India Release Text of 123 Agreement,” August 3, 2007. 
Available at http://www.state.gov/2007/aug/htm. 
 19 Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan, “The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
November 5, 2010. Available at http://www.cfr.org/india/us-india-nuclear-deal/p9663); Dr. Nasrullah 
Mirza and M. Sadiq, “Indo-U.S. Agreement: Impact on Deterrence Stability in South Asia,” SASSI 
Research Report 7, January 2008, Available at www.sassu.org.uk/pdfs/Research_Report_7.pdf; U.S. State 
Department, “U.S. and India Release Text of 123 Agreement,” Available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/aug/90050.htm. The terms of the deal require India to allow the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to its civilian nuclear program. It would continue the 
moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, strengthen security of its existing nuclear arsenal, and also work 
toward a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Most importantly, India must not share enrichment and 
reprocessing technologies with non-nuclear states, which counts as support for international non-
proliferation activities.  
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in Pakistan. For example, Pakistan expressed its strong resentment over the 123 
Agreement, decrying India’s special arrangement as a discriminatory deal tantamount to 
undermining the prospects of peace and security in the region.20 This feeling of insecurity 
is exacerbated by the open expression in the United States of distrust and doubts about 
Pakistan’s sincerity in fighting the GWOT.21 The explicit U.S. quest to assign India a 
larger politico-military role in Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal further complicates 
the picture, at least from Pakistan’s standpoint. Meanwhile, India’s growing belligerence 
and the unprecedented overt expression of it by the Indian military leadership casts a 
further cloud over the future of regional relations. In this context, the Indian military’s 
role in thwarting the process of rapprochement and confidence-building measures with 
Pakistan22 needs a special mention.    
The thesis argues that India will capitalize on its burgeoning relations with the 
United States to equip and train its armed forces to high levels of contemporary military 
prowess. At the same time, however, India will continue to act like a non-aligned nation, 
continuing to pick “a la carte” from the offerings that other states bring. In the past, India 
waved the banner of the non-aligned movement while acquiring substantial amounts of 
military equipment from the erstwhile USSR.23 This time, India will seek advanced U.S. 
technology without compromising much on its military ties with Russia, Israel, and 
France.24 
 Despite India’s decades-old reliance on multiple sources for military and 
economic support, it was obsessed with maintaining its ‘strategic autonomy’. According 
                                                 
 20 Dr. Nasrullah Mirza and M. Sadiq, “Indo-U.S. Agreement: Impact on Deterrence Stability in South 
Asia.”  
 21 Khurram Butt, “U.S.: An Ally or an Enemy of Pakistan?” Islamabad Times, July 20, 2011. 
Available at www.islamabadtimesonline.com/us-an-ally-or-an-enemy-of-pakistan/. 
 22 Kranti Kumara, “Mounting Tensions between India’s Army and Civilian Government,” 
International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), World Socialist website wsws.org, April 18, 
2012. Available at https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2012/04/indi-a18.html.  
 23 Serge Korepin and Shalini Sharan, “End of the Road? Not Quite,” The Impact of Decreasing 
Defense Cooperation on the Indo-Russian Bilateral Ties, CSIS, June 27, 2011. Available at csis.org › Blogs 
› rep’s blog. 
 24 Stephen Cohen, “Indo-U.S. Ties: The Ugly, the Bad and the Good,” Brookings Institute, February, 
2009. Available at www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2009/02/india-cohen. 
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to Dr. Upendra Choudhury, “The concept of strategic autonomy is one of the few 
hallmarks of Indian foreign policy that enjoyed unparalleled political consensus in the 
country.”25  However, a leading Indian-American South Asia expert Sumit Ganguly puts 
this Indian obsession to serious question:  
In the wake of the disastrous Sino-Indian border war of 1962, India sought 
military assistance from the United States. Soon thereafter, following the 
first Chinese nuclear test of 1964, India actually reportedly sought a 
nuclear guarantee from the United States. … India’s putative commitment 
to an autonomous foreign policy was compromised in the aftermath of the 
Indo-Soviet treaty of “peace, friendship and cooperation” of 1971. … 
India’s subsequent dependence on the Soviets for markets, weaponry and 
diplomatic leverage especially in the U.N. Security Council, compromised 
its independence of action.26    
This circumstance would bolster India’s (self-) image as a rising great power and 
a potential counter-weight to China. India would seek to be in a position to over-awe its 
traditional rival, Pakistan, and to sideline the contentious issues outstanding between 
them. Indian leaders will put all the right words in Western (read: U.S.) ears while 
continuing to pursue their long-term strategic interests. India will enhance its influence in 
Indian Ocean region by fulfilling its ambitions of having a “blue water” navy. In the long 
run, it will not do the U.S. bidding; it might even challenge the United States whenever 
their interests diverge.27 In other words, India will never be an “all-weather ally” of the 
United States. The growing U.S.-Indian defense cooperation does not portend good 
things for the strategic interests of Pakistan or the peace and security of South Asian 
region. 
                                                 
25 Dr. Upendra Choudhury, “India’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy in a Multipolar World,” 
International Political Science Association (IPSA). Available at www.ipsa.org/node/6721. 
26 Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Misguided Autonomy,” Diplomat, June 25, 2012. Available at 
thediplomat.com/indian-decade/2012/06/25/indias-misguided-autonomy. 
 27 A respected former Indian army chief, General S. Padmanabhan authored a book in 2004 titled, The 
Writing on the Wall: India Checkmates America 2017. In it, he paints a scenario of U.S. humiliation in a 
conflict with India that eventuates in the aftermath of an India-Pakistan war in which the United States 
supports Pakistan. In the preface, the author writes, “I have projected the events of early 2003 some 15 
years into the future . . . I have made many assumptions, quite a few of which do not appear realities or 
even possibilities today, but, which could conceivably become realities in 10 to 15 years’ time.” Although a 
work of fiction, the book provides a glimpse into the Indian military mindset. 
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The first—and worst—losers in this game are the people of South Asia, whose 
welfare and advancement are affected directly by the money and attention that is diverted 
to the unsettled strategic situation. Although human security is not the focus of this thesis, 
it is, needless to say, intertwined with the traditional concept of security, particularly in 
the context of South Asia. As a measure of human security, the Human Development 
Index (HDI) provides a composite measure of three basic dimensions of human 
development: health, education and income. India’s HDI stands at 0.554 today, which 
gives the country a rank of 136 out of 187 countries with comparable data. The HDI of 
South Asia as a region is 0.558, placing India below the regional average.28 According to 
the U.N. Human Development Report 2011, “Although placed in the medium category, 
India’s standing is way behind scores of economically less developed countries, including 
war-torn Iraq as well as the Philippines. India has the world’s largest number of multi-
dimensionally poor, more than half of the population, at 612 million. Its gender inequality 
index is 0.6, the highest in South Asia.”29 (Pakistan’s gender inequality index stands at 
0.567, marginally better than India.30)  In 2012, Pakistan’s HDI was 0.515 (below the 
regional average), which gave the country a rank of 146 out of 187 countries with 
comparable data.31 In Pakistan 49.4 percent of the population suffer multiple deprivations 
while an additional 11.0 percent are vulnerable to multiple deprivations.32 Real stability, 
real prosperity, real democracy is not possible in the region amid such a human crisis. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW—AND WHAT IS LEFT TO BE SAID 
In recent years many policy papers, review articles, and a few books have been 
written on how U.S.-Indian bilateral relations have markedly improved over the last 
                                                 
28 National Human Development Reports for India. Accessed March 25, 2013, available at 
hdrstats.undorg/en/countries/profiles/IND.html.. 
29  “India Ranks 134 in Human Development Index,” Hindustan Times, November 2, 2011. The 
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) identifies multiple deprivations in the same households in 
education, health and standard of living. 
30 International Human Development Indicators. Accessed on March 25, 2013, available at 
hdrstats.undorg/en/countries/profiles/PAK.html.  
31 Ibid. 
32 UNDP-Pakistan-Human Development Report. Available at undorg.pk/2011-human-development-
report-environmental-trends. (Accessed on March 25, 2013). 
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decade and the prospects for future. Defense cooperation has been portrayed as the 
foundation of such relations.33 Interestingly, much less comparable literature has come up 
on the variable nature and future contours of U.S.-Pakistan relations, though, the 
sinusoidal pattern of U.S.-Pakistan defense cooperation has been the subject of separate 
reports. How Iran and China factor into the U.S.-Indian and the U.S.-Pakistan 
relationships respectively has also been mentioned. What has not been explored much in 
this discourse is the prudence of U.S. policy of strategic de-hyphenation—the pursuit of 
relations with India and Pakistan independently of one another.34  
1. The United States and India 
Although the landmark U.S.-India civil nuclear deal has been much discussed, its 
distinct security-related aspects have not been amply flagged in this broader debate. A 
few research reports and theses by academic institutions and think tanks have addressed 
either the overall phenomenon of rising India or Indian defense transformation in terms 
of its enhanced collaboration with a number of countries around the globe.35  
There is a dominant school of thought led by the U.S. policy circles that have 
been the most optimistic about India. A November 2011 U.S. Department of Defense 
Report to Congress quotes President Obama calling U.S.-Indian security cooperation one 
                                                 
 33   Sumit Ganguly eds., U.S.-Indian strategic cooperation into the 21 st century; Strobe Talbot, 
Engaging India (Washington, D.C.:Brookings Institution Press, 2004); Stephen J. Blanks, Natural Allies? 
(Carlisle, PA, SSI Press, 2005); Henry Sokolski ed., Gauging U.S.-India Strategic Cooperation (Carlisle, 
PA, SSI Press, 2007);  Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, “A Way Forward in U.S.-India Defense 
Cooperation,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, July 2011; Tim Sullivan and Michael Mazza, 
“Shaping the Future of U.S.-India Defense Cooperation,” Center for Defense Studies  September 27, 
2010  ; “Report to Congress on U.S.-India Security Cooperation,” U.S. Department of Defense, November 
2011 ; Jim Garamone, “U.S. Military Seeks Stronger Ties with India,” U.S. Department of Defense, 
November 3, 2011; “Remarks at the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue,” U.S. Department of State, June 13, 
2012. 
34 Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, “A Way Forward in U.S.-India Defense Cooperation.”   
 35  Brian K. Hedrick, “India’s Strategic Defense Transformation: Expanding Global Relationships,” 
The Letort Papers,Strategic Studies Institute, 2009, 2; Robin J. Walker, “Awakening Tiger India’s Quest 
for Expanded Influence in the World,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 2008–03; Ingolf Kiesow 
and Nicklas Norling, “The Rise of India: Problems and Opportunities,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 
Silk Road Paper, January 2007;  Stephen  Cohen, “India Rising,” The Wilson Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 3, 
Summer 2000; Sumit Ganguly, “Think Again: India’s Rise,” Foreign Policy, July 5, 2012; Sumit Ganguly, 
“Will Kashmir Stop India’s Rise?” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006; Kanwal Sibal, “India’s Defence Ties 
with Europe,” Indian Defense Review, August 9, 2012. 
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of “the defining partnerships of the 21st century.”36 A “robust and mutually beneficial” 
partnership has been projected to grow in the next few years in the Asia-Pacific region 
and globally. Maritime security, counterterrorism, defense trade, and armaments 
cooperation would be the key areas under focus. During a July 2012 visit to New Delhi, 
U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter called India “an economic power 
with an increasing military capability.”37 Being the world’s largest democracy, India’s 
role in political stability of South Asia was termed crucial.38 However, a critical point Dr. 
Carter missed was the importance of strategic stability in South Asia, which has been 
elusive despite enviable democratic credentials of India.  
Ironically, before becoming a U.S. defense official, Carter wrote in 2006 that the 
United States would not necessarily benefit from security cooperation with India because, 
as a rising great power, India could opt to go its own way while pursuing its national 
interest.39 A member of the current U.S. administration, which is keen to woo India, 
Carter explains the change in his stance on this particular issue. In the same article, he 
writes: “India’s diplomats and civil servants are notorious for adhering to independent 
positions regarding the world order, economic development, and nuclear security. The 
architects of the India deal have suggested that such habits will quickly yield in the face 
of recent U.S. accommodations on the nuclear issue. But their expectation is naïve.40 The 
same dynamic holds today.    
A more typical American view of the situation comes from Robert Kaplan, who 
wrote that “rising India is the greatest piece of geopolitical good luck the United States 
                                                 
 36 Jim Garamone, “U.S. Military Seeks Stronger Ties with India,” American Forces Press Service, 
U.S. Department of Defense, November 3, 2011. Available at 
www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=65932. 
 37 Karen Parrish, “Carter Urges Closer U.S.-India Defense Cooperation,” American Forces Press 
Service, U.S. Department of Defense, July 23, 2012. Available at 
www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=117220. 
 38 Ibid. 
 39 Ashton B. Carter, “America’s New Strategic Partner?” Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 4, July- August 
2006, 43. Available at beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/a0706.html. 
40 Ibid., 44. 
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has come up since the end of Cold War.”41 During his May 13, 2011, address to the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 
South and Central Asian Affairs Mr. Robert O. Blake, Jr. echoed Kaplan’s optimism. In 
the context of strategic partnership, he claimed that rise of India was unquestionably in 
the U.S. national interest.42 He also stressed that it was a long-term relationship, but an 
even more important point that he made was that it should not be taken for granted. 
Actually this is the crucial point that policy makers and analysts tend to miss, especially 
when dealing with India, which has traditionally been obsessed with maintaining 
“strategic autonomy.”43  All the wishful thinking that Washington can muster may not 
persuade India to act consistently in line with U.S. interests. 
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated: “India and U.S. share the 
common goal of making this one of the principal relationships of our countries.”44 One—
but not the only one … Indian policy elites seem to be less giddy and more business-like 
than their U.S. counterparts when it comes to mutual defense collaboration. Official 
statements emanating from New Delhi are much more diplomatic. During his recent visit 
to New Delhi, Mr. Panetta declared the strategic partnership with India “a lynchpin” of 
new U.S. strategy in the Pacific region.45 However, the Indian response was rather cool 
as New Delhi is not given to clear alignments when it comes to foreign policy. “We’ll 
never be an alliance partner with the U.S.,” said Lalit Mansingh, an analyst and a former 
Indian ambassador to Washington. “The limit is a partnership.”46 The Indians feel that 
                                                 
 41 Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: 
Random House, 2006). 
 42 Robert O. Blake, “The Current State of U.S.-India Cooperation and Prospects for the Future,” May 
13, 2011. Available at www.state.gov ›  Releases › Remarks › 2011. 
 43 Dr. A. Adityanjee, “India-U.S. Tango: Part-Time Lovers!” The Council for Strategic Affairs, New 
Delhi, June 27, 2012. Available at councilforstrategicaffairs.blogspot.com/. /india-us-tango-part-time-low.  
 44 “Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Opening Statement at the Joint Press Conference at the White 
House,” July 18, 2005, available at <http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2005/July/22.htm. 
 45 David S. Cloud and Mark Magnier, “India Not Sold on Closer Military Ties with U.S.,” Los Angeles 
Times, June 6, 2012. Available at articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/06/. /la-fg-panetta-india-20120607. 
 46 Lalit Man Singh, India’s former Foreign Secretary and Indian Ambassador to the United States, 
“India-U.S. Relations- Are We There Yet?” Speech at Army War College, Mhow India, September 25, 
2006.Available at  http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/439796419IB39-LalitMansingh-
IndoUSStrategicPartnershipdf. 
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the offer of joint exercises or training and contingency handling in the Asia-Pacific 
region has all the trappings of an alliance in the sense of exactly the kind of permanent 
entanglement that the punctiliously nonaligned India has tried to avoid.47 
In India, there are two clear schools of thought when it comes to forging strategic 
relations with the United States. The first school feels that this bilateral relationship 
would be commensurate with India’s new status of emerging great power and hence in its 
long-term strategic interests. The other school of thought maintains that the United States 
is encouraging India to join a partnership that will serve mainly to contain China, even 
though categorically opting for the “Counter China” would not be beneficial for India in 
the longer run.48   
India has the option of following the middle course, too. It might astutely avail 
itself of the current U.S. benevolence by selectively acquiring cutting-edge defense 
technology as well as expertise through mutual exercises without clearly subscribing to a 
“Contain China” strategy. India is looking for U.S. arms but not its partnership.49 In their 
13th meeting in eight years, Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao at Rio de 
Janeiro, decided to take the India-China relationship to the next level by giving a boost to 
trade and emphasizing the resolution of the border dispute between the two countries. 
Going into a huddle on the first day of the Rio+20 conference, the Indian Prime Minister, 
who calls Wen his “close friend,” and his Chinese counterpart agreed to take steps to 
ensure that the bilateral trade between the two emerging economies reaches $100 billion 
by 2015.50 
                                                 
 47 Sourabh Gupta, “The Limits to U.S.-India Defense Ties,” Diplomat, July 30, 2011. Available at 
thediplomat.com/2011/07/30/the-limits-to-us-india-defence-ties/.  
 48 Arun Sahgal, “India and U.S. Rebalancing Strategy for Asia-Pacific,” Institute of Defense Studies 
and Analyses (IDSA), July 9, 2012; Lisa Curtis, “Going the Extra Mile for a Strategic U.S.-India 
Relationship,” The Heritage Foundation, August 20, 2012; Dr. A. Adityanjee, “India-U.S. Tango: Part-
Time Lovers,” The Council for Strategic Affairs, New Delhi, India, June 27, 2012; Sourabh Gupta, “The 
Limits to U.S.-India Defense Ties,” Diplomat, July 30, 2012; Indranil Banerjie, “India Must Keep Distance 
from China-West Conflict,” Asian Age, July 20, 2012.  
49 David S. Cloud and Mark Magnier, “India Not Sold on Closer Military Ties with U.S.”  
 50 Shobhan Saxena, “India-China Bilateral Trade Set to Hit $100 Billion by 2015, Times of India, Jun 
21, 2012. Available at timesofindia.indiatimes.com › Business. 
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Owing to its growing energy needs, India is expected to continue pursuing its 
robust relations with Iran, which has the world’s fourth-largest reserve of oil and the 
second-largest proven reserves of gas.51 Iran is anxious to get its hydrocarbons out of the 
ground and into new markets, and energy-hungry India wants to be such a market.52 As 
the United States isolates Iran by pushing countries to cut oil purchases and other 
commerce with the Islamic republic, India is building new trade ties there, saying Iran is 
its path to building the influence it needs in Central Asia and Afghanistan.53 Secretary of 
State Hillary Rodham Clinton arrived in New Delhi in May 2012, after declaring that 
India should reduce imports of Iranian oil and comply with Western sanctions. Yet across 
town, India and Iran were trying to figure out ways to do business together.54 Hence in 
some of the literature on U.S.-India relations, the latter’s relations with Iran are portrayed 
as a stumbling block.   
2. The United States and Pakistan 
In the realm of U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation, the usual diplomatic homilies 
notwithstanding, the dominant narrative in the literature is that this relationship has been 
intermittent and is likely to remain so in the future as well.55 U.S. interest in this 
relationship has transformed from its imperative to check the spread of communism in 
the last century to its current mission to stop the spread of terrorism in the new 
millennium. The threat of and from India, as well as the drive for attaining strategic 
                                                 
 51 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Brief: Iran,” Last Update: October 16, 
2012. Available at www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=IR. 
 52 Christine Fair, “India-Iran Security Ties: Thicker than Oil,” in Sokolski ed. Gauging U.S.-India 
Strategic Partnership (Carlisle, PA: SSI, 2002), 275. 
 53 Rebecca Byerly, “Why India is Trying to Expand Trade with Iran,” Christian Science Monitor, 
March 29, 2012. Available at www.csmonitor.com/. /2012/. /Why-India-is-trying-to-expand-trade.  
 54 Jim Yardley, “Indians Host Clinton While Also Wooing Iran,” New York Times, May 8, 2012. 
Available at www.nytimes.com/2012/. /india-and-iran-keep-economic-relations-d.  
 55 Salma M. Siddiqui, “Pakistan Weary of U.S. Alliance,” International Relations and Security 
Network (ISN), November 18, 2010. Available at www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id.  
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parity with it, drives Pakistan’s relations with the United States.56 There is also a feeling 
that the United States has been the primary beneficiary of this asymmetric partnership, 
which some analysts term a “marriage of convenience.”57 While complaining about U.S. 
“strategic unfaithfulness” toward Pakistan, the analysts tend to forget the famous 
statement by the British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston that “a country does not have 
permanent friends, only permanent interests.”58 Pakistan has also benefited from this 
relationship. Instead of just bemoaning the fragility of this alliance, analysts should 
concentrate on how best Pakistan can continue to benefit from it. In this sense, the 
partnership is at least half full, rather than half empty. 
Another common refrain is that growing U.S.-India defense cooperation threatens 
Pakistan’s security interests. Riaz Haq writes: “The U.S. support is emboldening India’s 
military, and its leadership has already started saber rattling against Pakistan and 
China.”59 In the context of Pakistan’s security concerns, Zafar Nawaz Jaspal (Assistant 
Professor of International Relations at Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad) writes: 
“Pakistan’s strategic outlook has been influenced by a geo-military disequilibrium that is 
highly favorable to India.” He goes on: “India is a strong motivating factor in 
Islamabad’s willingness to renew the defense relationship with Washington. India’s 
earnest desire is to disrupt Pakistan-U.S. defense cooperation.”60  A leading Pakistani 
security analyst, Dr. Shireen Mazari states: “The deepening U.S.-India strategic 
relationship, particularly in nuclear field, hardly bodes well for the regional security.”61  
                                                 
 56 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Enhanced Defense Cooperation between the United States and Pakistan,” 
Strategic Insights, vol. VI, Issue 4, June 2007. Available at mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/. 
/en/jaspalJun07.pdf. 
57 Ibid. 
 58 Lord Palmerston (British Prime Minister: 1855–1865), Speech to the House of Commons (1 March 
1848), Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates. 3rd series, vol. 97, col. 122. 
 59 Riaz Haq, “Growing U.S.-India Military Cooperation Threatens Pakistan,” Pakistan Link, 
September 13, 2012. Available at pakistanlink.org/Opinion/2010/Jan10/29/04.HTM. 
60 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Enhanced Defense Cooperation between the United States and Pakistan.” 
 61 Dr. Shireen Mazari, “South Asian Security: International Context,” Policy Perspectives, vol. 3, no. 
1. July 6, 2005. Available at www.ips.org.pk › Global Issues and Politics. 
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Recent and unprecedented belligerent statements by the Indian generals and even 
the army chief are quoted to lend credence to this argument.62 However, the point that 
such analysts miss is that such outbursts could be aimed more at their domestic or 
Western audiences than their adversarial neighbors. Another point that is missed is that 
such Indian military rhetoric provides an opportunity for Pakistan, too. Islamabad can 
present these “threats” as “opportunities” to seek assistance from interested stakeholders 
in a bid to strengthen itself. It might be difficult to dismiss totally the assertion that 
growing military muscle will turn India even more belligerent and intransigent in dealing 
with its neighbors, especially Pakistan. The analysts, however, tend to overlook the 
possibility of drawing some benefit out of this strategic challenge, provided Pakistan 
plays its cards well.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis adopts the comparative approach, commencing with the exploration of 
primary sources such as declassified U.S. documents as well as secondary open sources 
like official statements and reports from the United States, India, and Pakistan. 
Additionally, analyses by the leading experts in the field of security and strategic studies 
as well as think tanks provide the basis for much of the analysis that follows. In the 
interests of balance, sources from the United States and the West, India, and Pakistan 
inform these pages. The views of the independent U.S. experts on South and Central Asia 
and U.S. scholars of Indian and Pakistani origin (though relatively few) enjoy special 
emphasis, including books and papers authored or edited by such renowned regional 
experts as Alan Kronstadt, Andrew Scobell, Christine Fair, Feroz Khan, Henry Sokolski, 
Maleeha Lodhi, Michael Chambers, Paul Kapur, Rifaat Hussain, Shireen Mazari, Stephen 
Blank, Stephen Cohen, Strobe Talbott, Sumit Ganguly, Sunil Dasgupta, Teresita 
Schaffer, and Zafar Jaspal. 
As this topic is a current issue, much has been written and continues to be written 
in the leading newspapers and journals. To that end, major U.S. newspapers like New 
                                                 
 62 Kranti Kumara, “Mounting Tensions Between India’s Army and Civilian Government,” World 
Socialist website, April 18, 2012. Available at www.wsws.org/topics/country/as-ind/.  
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York Times and Washington Post, Pakistani newspapers like Dawn and News, and Indian 
newspapers like Times of India and Hindustan Times provide valuable, current material. 
Other credible news sources would also be tapped. Apart from these sources, reports by 
the Congressional Research Service, the Center for Security and International Studies, 
and the Heritage Foundation represent scholarly viewpoints on emerging question. 
Analyses from Indian think tanks like Institute for Defense and Strategic Analyses, 
United Services Institute and Pakistani Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, 
Islamabad Policy Research Institute, and Institute of Strategic Studies Research and 
Analysis at the National Defense University Islamabad also figure in the present study.63 
The analysis that follows is objective in the scholarly sense but perhaps not 
neutral—in the sense that the author is a senior officer in the Pakistan armed forces with a 
decided stake in the outcome of the strategic contest in South Asia. Stability and 
prosperity on the subcontinent clearly would benefit a billion or so souls, the author 
included; reliably peaceable relations between India and Pakistan would allow both 
powers to focus on the not inconsiderable regional and global security concerns that they 
both face—separately—today. Most certainly, this thesis is not a screed or a blind rant 
against a demonized “hereditary enemy.”  Built on scholarship from all sides of the South 
Asian question, it elucidates the strategic concerns that have shaped U.S. security 
cooperation in the region to date and the ramifications in the near and medium term of the 
likeliest strategic and political decisions to emerge, particularly as the United States shifts 
gears in Afghanistan and other contender powers, including India, orient themselves for 
the next challenges. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II traces the genesis and development of U.S. security relations with the 
major powers of South Asia, in the Cold War era. First, it addresses India amid the 
broader context of the respective foreign policies in which these relations are embedded. 
                                                 
 63 While selecting the sources, effort has been made to represent the views of various stakeholders and 
experts on the subject across the policy and intellectual divide in the United States, India, Pakistan, and 
beyond.    
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Then, it dilates upon U.S. relations with Pakistan, using the same format and context. 
These two studies provide a comparative analysis of these relations, which are basically 
driven by the U.S. view of India and Pakistan and that, thus, color the whole security 
cooperation venture.  
Chapter III deals with the transformation of the respective relations in the last 
decade of the 20th century and first decade of the new millennium—which has been 
unprecedented in case of U.S.-India relations. It has not only affects the current strategic 
and security environment in South Asia but it might also affect Central Asia, Indian 
Ocean Region, as well as Asia-Pacific.  
Chapter IV, in essence, forms an informed “crystal-ball gazing” with respect to 
this complex trilogy of relations. The vital question of de-hyphenating U.S. relations with 
the two lead players in South Asia forms the core of this chapter. Pakistan’s role and 
interests in this connection receive detailed attention; in part because these aspects tend to 
get lost first in the heated rhetoric that punctuates the peaks and valleys of its relations 
with the United States.  
The final chapter contains the conclusions and recommendations for the policy 
and security elite of the lead actors in this “strategic love-triangle.” Going by the 
historical precedence and current trends, U.S.-India defense relations are not likely to 
flourish in a significant way in the near future, nor are U.S.-Pakistan relations likely to 
undergo any major transformation for the better. If U.S.-India relations develop the way 
they are being projected by the two sides, especially if that means exclusion of Pakistan 
from the equation, it will have serious ramifications for the security and strategic stability 
in the region.  
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II. SECURITY COOPERATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS—THE 
UNITED STATES, INDIA, AND PAKISTAN IN THE COLD-WAR 
ERA 
India, a British colony for more than a century, was granted independence in 1947 
not as one country but as two: India and Pakistan. The two countries were formed on a 
communal basis—roughly dividing the Muslim and non-Muslim population of the 
erstwhile “jewel” of British imperialism, and their conflicting founding 
narratives/identities made for fraught relations right from the beginning. The emergence 
of these two states in South Asia coincided with the growing U.S. interest in the region 
owing to its urge to check the spread of communism. Within a decade of gaining 
independence, India and Pakistan got involved in defense cooperation with the United 
States. From these first moments, the differences between South Asia’s two largest 
powers, refracted through the divergent U.S. views of and policies toward India and 
Pakistan, settled into distinctive tracks for strengthening each state’s “defense position,” 
as contemporary policy classified such cooperation. Consequently, over the next four 
decades, U.S-India and U.S.-Pakistan relations were primarily driven by the cold war 
dynamics on one hand and Indo-Pak rivalry on the other.      
A. THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA: A RELUCTANT 
RELATIONSHIP 
From the outset, the United States regarded India with a slightly wary optimism—
and still managed, at most turns, to expect rather more from India than it got. 
1. Getting the Post-Independence Period Right  
The stakes were high. Echoing concerns floated throughout the U.S. national 
security community, the State Department’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs wrote in 1952:  “Communist gains in the 
recent elections in India show clearly that the conditions our program is designed to 
combat are being successfully exploited by Communist agents. [The office] believes that 
if South Asia is subverted it will be only a matter of time before all of the Asian land-
mass and over a billion people will be under Communist domination, and our national 
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security will face an unprecedented threat.”64  The concern was overwhelmingly 
economic—could India become reliably self-sustaining before the next elections, which 
would happen in 1956–1957 at the latest?65  
Policy recommendations were primarily economic, as well—for example, a 
contentious $125 million in proposed aid to India in 1952–1953. As U.S. Ambassador to 
India Chester B. Bowles expounded in a telegram that he intended to reach President 
Truman: 
[India is the] [s]econd largest country in world in a key strategic position 
in Asia. Present government devoted democratic way, sound development 
program ready to go, great natural resources, willing people. Short on 
food, capital, technical know-how. Half measure can result disintegration 
present democratic government, despair of people, open invitation to 
waiting Communists take over. 
Your proposed program aimed to reach 120 million village people India in 
4 years time and make India wholly self-supporting in food and probably 
cotton within that period. Our entire emphasis on making dollars produce 
several times their value in production here. Total 4-year cost for 360 
million Indian people no more than amount spent on economic aid Greece 
and annual total economic and military aid committed to Formosa, an 
island of 8 million which symbolizes Communist victory in China, a 
nation of 400,000,000. 
If Republican Party refuses to support this program for India then the basic 
political motivation and dishonesty of their criticism past Chinese policy 
                                                 
 64 Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and 
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will be dramatically evident to all concerned. I believe this program is not 
only minimum on an economic basis but also sound politically and truly 
vital if we not to share responsibility India going way of China.66 
Military aid was also forthcoming, as befit an independent emerging democracy 
in a tough strategic neighborhood. Soon after Indian independence, the United States 
supplied 200 Sherman tanks worth $19 million to India, thus becoming the first country 
to establish defense trade with India.67 Despite Pakistan’s insistence that further military 
sales to India would deform the regional military balance in India’s favor,68 the United 
States also supplied fifty-four C-119 Fairchild military transport aircraft to India.69 
The difficulty arose with India’s founding leader and Prime Minister, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, who opted for non-alignment as the basis of India’s post-independence foreign 
policy. For Nehru, non-alignment meant pursuing Indian national interests independent of 
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the Cold War antagonists: the United States and the Soviet Union.70 This stance meant 
that foreign aid or assistance to India had to come, officially at least, with no strings 
attached—which proposition Nehru’s government tested early and often. For example, 
the United States discovered in 1953 that India had authorized shipments of thorium 
nitrate to China, despite its acquiescence to the Battle Act that precluded such sales or 
shipments to the communist world.71  (Thorium can be used as a nuclear fuel.)  When the 
American embassy in New Dehli—now led by George Allen, a career diplomat who did 
not share Bowles’s ardent boosterism of India—leaned on Nehru to uphold India’s end of 
the Battle Act, preferably in public, Nehru reminded his interlocutors of the no-strings 
requirement.72  In a telegram that ultimately landed before the president, Ambassador 
Allen advocated the Nehru be required to make a “clear-cut” request for U.S. aid that 
thus would activate the Battle Act—and that Washington be prepared to curtail its 
assistance for some time in the (very likely) absence of such an avowal.73  In the end, the 
United States had to content itself with a collection of variously official statements since 
1951, assembled by embassy staff, to stand in for an assertion of India’s commitment to 
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the West in return for U.S. aid.74  Washington also undertook to buy thorium compounds 
from India as a replacement for such sales to China.75 
 Worse from Washington’s perspective, India’s foreign policy in fact distinctly 
inclined toward the USSR, in no small part due to Nehru’s personal leanings toward 
socialist ideals.76 Nehru and his successors stood a common ground with USSR on a host 
of issues. “The Soviet leaders endorsed the entire range of Indian foreign policy based on 
the Panch Shila and supported India’s position against Pakistan on Kashmir. The Soviet 
Union also supported India’s position vis-à-vis Portugal on Goa, which was territorially 
integrated into India as a union territory by the Indian armed forces in December 1961.”77 
However, Nehru visited the United States in 1949, 1956, and again in 1961,78 and India 
never hesitated to accept U.S. military assistance whenever it was available.79 In all, 
during this period, India received some $10 billion in U.S. assistance.80 
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2. Bold Step:  The Indian Invasion of Goa 
Goa on the Indian Ocean had been a Portuguese colony for four and a half 
centuries, one of a handful of Portuguese possession on the Indian subcontinent after 
independence from Britain. A local resistance to Portuguese rule on Goa arose, 
coinciding with the broader wave of regional independence movements in the early 20th 
century, including the formation in the interwar period of a Goa Congress Committee 
with Indian support and solidarity. Armed groups also formed as the struggle over Goa’s 
future intensified following Indian independence. In 1955, the death of a few Goan and 
Indian protesters on a “liberation march” at the hands of Portuguese forces provided the 
opportunity for India to intervene. A large number of Indian troops, duly supported by the 
navy and air force, invaded the territory and annexed it after defeating the grossly out-
numbered Goan forces.81  
The United States condemned the Indian invasion and pointed out the double 
standards of Nehru, who had been lecturing U.S. leaders against use of force in foreign 
affairs. President Kennedy wrote to Prime Minister Nehru on January 18, 1962: 
… I should like to say a word about the more immediate issue, that of the 
effect of the Goan episode on the relations between our two countries. It 
has not been good, but there may be useful lessons from the experience.  
I have also been disturbed by the chain effect of this action on other parts 
of the world. Public opinion does not easily differentiate between the use 
of troops for good and bad purposes. And all countries, including of 
course the United States, have a great capacity for convincing themselves 
of the full righteousness of their particular cause. No country ever uses 
force for reasons it considers unjust. 
I fear that the episode in Goa will make it harder to hold the line for peace 
in other places. 
But my major concern was and continues to be the effect of the action on 
our joint tasks, especially in terms of its impact on American opinion. 
Unfortunately the hard, obvious fact for our people was the resort to 
force—and by India. This was a shock to the majority who has admired 
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your country’s ardent advocacy of peaceful methods, and reinforcement to 
those who did not enjoy what they called “irresponsible lectures.82   
 Public opinion in the United States did sour briefly, though popular press 
coverage at the time tended to focus on the United Nations’ silence on the invasion, 
enforced by a sure Soviet veto of any Security Council response and the momentum of 
decolonization, at least where European imperialism was concerned.83 From the 
American vantage, Goa was just a sign of the times. Kennedy’s own school-masterly tone 
notwithstanding, Washington ultimately did nothing to curtail foreign aid and security 
assistance on India. In his letter to Prime Minister Nehru, President Kennedy also wrote: 
“There is also the problem of aid appropriations. This, I should make clear, is not a 
question of strings; nothing could be farther from my thought than to make our assistance 
to India contingent on her acceptance of our particular wishes in foreign or domestic 
policy.”84  Thus, did Kennedy establish Washington’s tendency to tiptoe around India’s 
much-touted but tendentiously practiced non-alignment. 
3. The Sino-Indian War: A Rude Awakening and Reorientation for 
India  
Emboldened by their Goan adventure, the Indians sought to resolve their long-
standing border dispute with China again by the use of force. In late 1961 and early 1962, 
Indian troops moved forward into Chinese-occupied territory. During the next few 
months, tensions continued to mount due to Indian failure to withdraw despite clear 
warnings by the Chinese. Instead, the Indian government resorted to its characteristic 
diplomatic double-speak to build its own wiggle room. Finally, the Chinese lost their 
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patience and wiped out a brigade of Indian forces through a “punitive expedition” on 
October 20, 1962.85  
Nehru was so unnerved by the humiliating rout that he frantically sought U.S. aid 
in two letters to President Kennedy in November 1962.86 In his biography of Nehru, 
Gopal summarized these two letters as: 
… describing the situation as “really desperate” and requesting the 
immediate dispatch of a minimum of twelve squadrons of supersonic all-
weather fighters and the setting up of radar communications. American 
personnel would have to man these fighters and installations and protect 
Indian cities from air attacks by the Chinese till India personnel had been 
trained. If possible, the United States should also send planes flown by 
American personnel to assist the Indian Air Force in any battles with the 
Chinese in Indian air space; but aerial action by Indian elsewhere would 
be the responsibility of the Indian Air Force. Nehru also asked for two B-
47 bomber squadrons to enable India to strike at Chinese bases and air 
fields, but to learn to fly these planes Indian pilots and technicians would 
be sent immediately for training in the United States. All such assistance 
and equipment would be utilized solely against the Chinese.87 
Ironically, Nehru, who cherished socialist ideals and had been a pioneer of the 
non-aligned movement, cited the common democratic values between the United States 
and India, to curry favor with Kennedy.88  (The Soviets, who had praised the intervention 
in Goa by their new friend and client, India, had rather less to say about the set-to with 
China, a “fraternal” communist power with which relations were deteriorating.)    The 
United States responded favorably and, as a result, India received a steady flow of U.S. 
grants and military sales between 1963 and 1965.  
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This brief period of bonhomie ended with the U.S. embargo of both India and 
Pakistan in the wake of their 1965 war.89  Moreover, the American Congress was taking 
an ever dimmer view of foreign aid. By the later 1960s, with the United States sinking 
into the “quagmire” of the war in Vietnam, the Conte90 and Symington91 amendments 
sought to regulate U.S. foreign aid, particularly in states that seemed, to American 
taxpayers, only to turn around and use the money to finance more turmoil and violence. 
Both acts had the potential to limit significantly U.S. aid to India, but they had less effect 
than their authors might have hoped. In the event, the Indians carried on with their 
plans92—playing carefully to Cold War geo-strategic concerns all the while.   
Indira Gandhi vigorously followed the same no-strings track as Nehru had 
pioneered. Washington was disappointed, though not deterred. Walt Rostow, then acting 
as special assistant to President Lyndon Johnson, wrote to his president:  “We have tried 
to use the delay to find ways to use the loan as political leverage with Mrs. Gandhi and to 
impress on her how painful it is to get these large sums for a country that isn’t always as 
helpful as we could wish. I am afraid we have come up empty.”93  Indeed, that same year, 
Indian Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Morarji Desai, told the U.S. 
ambassador: “One thing must be clear: no matter how much money you give us, we 
cannot compromise our right as a sovereign nation to make our own decisions regarding 
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military defense. If this has become a condition of U.S. aid, we shall have to get along 
without it.”94 
When the Republican Nixon administration replaced the Democratic Johnson 
administration, it maintained the high level of White House interest in South Asia but to 
even less effect. As a part of her world tour aimed at conditioning the international 
environment for ultimate Indian invasion of East Pakistan, Indira Gandhi had visited the 
White House on November 4 and 5, 1971—for discussions that Henry Kissinger later 
characterized as “the two most unfortunate meetings that Nixon had with any foreign 
leader.”95 In a follow up to her visit: 
President Nixon and Henry Kissinger met in the Oval Office of the White 
House on the morning of November 5, 1971, to discuss Nixon’s 
conversation with Prime Minister Gandhi on the previous day. Kissinger’s 
overall assessment was that “the Indians are bastards anyway. They are 
starting a war there.… To them East Pakistan is no longer the issue. Now, 
I found it very interesting how [Gandhi] carried on to you yesterday about 
West Pakistan.” He felt, however, that Nixon had achieved his objective in 
the conversation: “While she was a bitch, we got what we wanted, too. 
She will not be able to go home and say that the United States didn’t give 
her a warm reception and therefore in despair she’s got to go to war.96 
 Despite the famous personal antipathy between Richard Nixon and Indira 
Gandhi, in the interlude between Indian-Pakistan wars, 1965–1971, “India received $4.2 
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billion of American economic aid, about $1.5 billion of it during the Nixon years” 
starting in 1969.97 
4. Indian Invasion of East Pakistan: The Birth of Bangladesh 
Due to inept policies adopted by successive governments based in West Pakistan, 
the majority Bengali population of East Pakistan progressively developed a sense of 
political and socio-economic deprivation and neglect at the hands of their dominant West 
Pakistani compatriots. This feeling was exacerbated by the inadequate response by 
resource-constrained Islamabad to two natural calamities that befell East Pakistan in 
1970: a huge flood in August and a devastating cyclone in November.98 The East 
Pakistanis vented their feelings by heavily supporting the Awami League in December 
1970 national elections, thus giving the East Pakistani party an overwhelming majority to 
form the national government. However, a political crisis was created when Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto—whose Pakistan People’s Party had won a simple majority in the West 
Pakistan—thwarted the constitutional right of Awami League to form the national 
government.99  
India sought to capitalize on simmering Bengali discontent in the wake of this 
political crisis. According to Feroz Khan: 
Among the brewing conflicts and growing polarization of Pakistan’s two 
ends, Indian intelligence operatives intensified their subversive activities 
by exploiting Pakistani miseries and openly abetting the Bengali rebels. 
As tens of thousands of East Pakistani refugees fled to India, many of 
them volunteered to be trained for the insurgency. India established 
hundreds of training camps and prepared a rebellion force that would 
famously be known as the Mukti Bahini (“Freedom Fighters”).100 
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Consequently, the Pakistan Army, being chief custodian of the integrity of the 
country, launched a crackdown against the dissidents on March 25, 1971. The resulting 
civil war-like situation presented India with a golden opportunity to intervene and peel 
off the poor but populous East Pakistan. That would shatter Pakistan’s ideological 
foundation (nationhood based on common religion: Islam) and a vivisected Pakistan 
would no longer pose a “two-front” situation to India in any future conflict.101  
“Throughout the summer of 1971, the U.S. embassy in India tried to mediate between 
New Delhi, Islamabad, and Mujibnagar [Awami League’s headquarters established in the 
Indian city of Calcutta], but to no avail.”102 When India formally launched an invasion of 
East Pakistan on December 3, 1971, heavily out-numbered and ill-equipped Pakistan 
Army formations—with only one air force squadron at their disposal—gave a good 
account of themselves in the opening days of war. However, they could not long 
withstand India’s overwhelming multi-pronged thrusts, duly supported by thousands of 
Mukti Bahini forces, toward East Pakistan’s capital, Dacca. After the final Indian assault 
on Dacca on December 15, 1971, Pakistani forces finally surrendered on December 16, 
thus heralding the creation of Bangladesh.103 This humiliating surrender and resultant 
Indian arrogance left deep scars on Pakistani psyche which guided its security and 
foreign policies in the following decades.               
5. The Nuclear Dimension 
As India embarked upon its nuclear program in mid-1950s, it was fully supported 
by the United States, which trained Indian scientists at U.S. facilities, built Indian nuclear 
infrastructure at Tarapur, and provided heavy water for that facility. In 1974, India made 
demonstratively real the potential for the dual use of the infrastructure meant for nuclear 
energy when it tested a nuclear explosive device, which could form the basis for 
production of nuclear weapons. On May 18, 1974, All-India Radio announced, “At 8:05 
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a.m. this morning, India successfully conducted an underground nuclear explosion for 
peaceful purposes.”104  
By whatever name, the U.S. reaction to India’s nuclear detonation can be gauged 
from the excerpts of a Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency on May 18, 1974: 
The nth power has finally come forward. The Indian test is a setback to 
nonproliferation; we had made it clear to the Indians that we opposed a 
test by them, even one labeled, as in this instance, a peaceful nuclear 
explosion (PNE). The implications could be considerable, both with 
regard to South Asia and in the broad nonproliferation context. … The 
most immediate problem will be containing the Pakistani reaction. 
The Indian test is bound to have an un-settling effect on the South Asia 
scene, most particularly on the Pakistanis. Whatever the Indians say, the 
Pakistanis will regard India’s going nuclear as posing a new threat to 
Pakistani security. It will intensify their efforts to get a change in our arms 
policy; they could seek added security assurances from China and the U.S. 
They could conceivably decide to launch their own crash program, 
although we estimate that their capabilities for doing this are extremely 
limited.105 
Interestingly, during his October 1974 visit to India, Kissinger remarked, “India 
and the USA now shared another common tradition.” He also renewed commitment to 
supply nuclear fuel for U.S.-built Tarapur reactors despite the fact that Indians had used 
the U.S.-supplied heavy water in their Canadian-built CIRUS reactor to produce the fuel 
for their PNE.106 By this time, Kissinger was himself immersed in his shuttle diplomacy 
in the Middle East. The United States was reeling from the oil crisis, while Richard 
Nixon was girding for the so-called Watergate scandal that was about to end his 
presidency. To the extent that Kissinger concerned himself with nuclear weapons, his 
focus went to the Soviets and arms-limitation negotiations. 
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Later, however, in order to have a formal mechanism against such exploitation of 
peaceful nuclear energy programs by regulating nuclear exports, the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG) was formed in 1975 under the auspices of the United States.107 In 1978, the 
NSG introduced regulatory guidelines to ensure that nuclear exports that were meant for 
generating nuclear energy could not be diverted towards nuclear weapons programs.108   
In 1978, the U.S. legislature introduced stringent rules to govern nuclear exports to non-
nuclear states by passing the Nuclear Non–Proliferation Act.109  However, the U.S. 
nuclear fuel supply to India continued through1980. 
6. Genuine Reciprocity? 
The 1971 Indo-Pak war, highlighted Cold War political dynamics, and India was 
forced to review its avowed policy of non-alignment. Indian perceptions about the United 
States and China leaning toward Pakistan, threw it squarely into the Soviets’ lap. In the 
wake of the bilateral “Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation” of 1971, USSR 
emerged as a principal arms supplier for India. United States and India embarked on even 
frostier relations than during almost the entire period of the Cold War.110    
Still, the United States kept extending itself and its offers of goodwill, 
partnership, and aid in the name of keeping South Asia out of the Soviet camp. As Henry 
Kissinger noted to Lakshmi Kant Jha on the eve of the Indian ambassador’s departure 
from Washington in 1973:   
We had always treated you with a mixture of narcissism — seeing things 
in you that flattered ourselves. The noble savage. I am being very candid. 
Then you acted like a great power; you got in our way and we had to 
oppose you. 
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But now we can deal in a mature way with each other. We recognize you 
as a major power in South Asia—from Indochina to the Middle East. 
Therefore, your concerns have to be taken seriously by us. And your 
concerns and interests are rather parallel to ours. We do not want any 
outside power to dominate South Asia. So I think we can deal on the basis 
of genuine reciprocity.111 
The question for U.S. policymakers then—and later—is whether this reciprocity ever 
genuinely eventuated. 
B. THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN: A MIXED MILIEU 
The United States moved quickly to establish bilateral relations with Pakistan 
upon independence, just as it had with India. The U.S. motive behind establishing its 
relations with Pakistan was the same as its relations with India: having regional allies 
against the Soviet threat. Unlike India, Pakistan tended to share some of the American 
alarm about Soviet designs in the region—and found reasons to worry about Chinese 
expansionism, as well—and, thus, actively oriented itself toward the West, particularly 
the United States,112  though Pakistani leaders did not shy away from critical 
observations about, for example, the French colonial policy in northern Africa or the 
generally dismal record of in attaining any kind of resolution in Kashmir.113    But, as the 
U.S. National Security Estimate of 1953, prepared by the Intelligence Advisory 
Committee and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), noted, “Pakistan’s neutralism 
lacks the doctrinaire quality of India’s. Pakistan’s sympathies are definitely with the U.S. 
and its allies. Its failure to align itself [formally] with the Western camp can be attributed 
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in part to its preoccupation with the Kashmir problem and to its desire to win friends and 
supporters in the Moslem Middle East, but results mainly from the lack of any 
sufficiently attractive Western offer in return for its support.”114   As such, the wisest 
course for Washington, according to top-level advisers, was to “[g]ive special 
consideration to Pakistan in providing grant military assistance, in view of Pakistan’s 
attitude and key position among the countries of South Asia with respect to military 
collaboration with the West.”115  
Both sides understood that, in the first instance, Pakistan’s urge to seek U.S. 
security assistance was rooted in its deep sense of insecurity vis-à-vis India.116  The 
tensions—and contentions—between the two South Asian powers led the United States 
to think of defense cooperation with both states in the same breath. For example, the draft 
document that eventually became the first Eisenhower administration’s National Security 
Council policy for South Asia, NSC 5409, included among its courses of action: “Make 
clear to India that by providing military assistance to Pakistan, the U.S. is not seeking to 
make Pakistan the dominant state of South Asia.”117   The hyphen had not yet appeared 
in American relations with India and Pakistan, but the basic premise made the first steps 
possible. 
In March 1954, President Eisenhower accepted the policy statement on South 
Asia that included this view of Pakistan. In May of the same year, the United States and 
Pakistan formalized their bilateral security understanding in the form of the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Agreement, which opened U.S. training facilities for the Pakistani 
security forces’ personnel. It also enabled the U.S. military advisors to be stationed in 
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Pakistan.118  Pakistan was firmly planted in the pro-U.S./anti-Soviet camp when it joined 
two regional defense pacts, the SEATO and the CENTO, in 1955.119  As a result of these 
alliances, Pakistan received more than $700 million in military aid from 1955 to 1965.120   
1. Flying High or Flying Solo? The U-2 Debacle 
Almost from the beginning of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, Washington had its 
eye on rights to facilities and infrastructure in Pakistan.121   This ambition was no arm’s 
length arrangement with a non-aligned power. Even after the prospects of an imminent 
Soviet incursion into South Asia dimmed, the United States still wanted to launch its spy 
aircraft from the bases in the region to monitor Soviet military activities. Pakistan, owing 
to its geographical location and consistently pro-American attitude, seemed to be the 
right choice. Hence, in 1956, the United States approached Pakistan with a request to 
lease its northwestern base at Peshawar. Initially, Pakistan’s civilian leadership demurred 
as Pakistan was going through domestic crisis owing to conflicting interests of two 
ethnically diverse wings of the country (West and East Pakistan) which were 1000 miles 
apart geographically. That crisis spanning over almost a decade motivated General Ayub 
Khan to carry out a military coup in 1958.122 Once in power, President Ayub Khan who 
was looking for the U.S. support accepted its request for using the Peshawar airbase. 
Consequently, U.S. U-2 spy planes commenced their operations from Pakistan’s 
Peshawar air base.123   
In May 1960, one such plane—bearing the purposefully nondescript identifier 
“Article 360” and piloted by one Francis Gary Powers, was shot down by a Soviet 
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surface-to-air missile over Soviet territory. Moscow was enraged, not only with the 
United States but with Pakistan, as well, for enabling the spying flights.  (The American 
popular press, among other sources, had made frequent mention of the U.S. bases in 
Pakistan, which made them difficult to deny outright.) Without particularly veiling the 
threat, the Soviets informed Pakistan that it would face immediate retaliation if the U-2 
operations continued from Peshawar. Ayub made an open show of bravado, responding 
to a press question about the Soviet pressures by asking, “Do I look like a frightened 
man?”    
But behind the scenes, Pakistani officials sought to secure more from the United 
States than assurances that it would come to Pakistan’s aid in the event of an attack—
notably 30 additional F-104s. Actually, the request represented an addition of 18 aircraft 
to an earmark already in process—and now largely bogged down in the works between 
the U.S. Departments of State and Defense amid the domestic budget cycles.124   The 
drawn-out response left Pakistan’s government in an awkward position. The U.S. 
embassy in Karachi reported on August 12, 1960: 
Because of the U–2 episode and its aftermath, President Ayub and Foreign 
Minister Qadir, while not weakening their adherence to the alliance with 
the United States, expressed a diminution of confidence in America’s 
ability to act quickly, decisively, and competently in a crisis. Neutralist 
sentiment was expressed in some quarters and invidious comparisons were 
drawn about America’s aid program to its ally, Pakistan, and neutralist 
India and Afghanistan. The [Government of Pakistan] looked for ways to 
relieve Soviet pressure—by urging us to be more forceful with the Soviets, 
on the one hand, and by asking the Soviets for technical aid on the other 
hand. (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.00/8–1260)125 
                                                 
124 See “Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State,” July 5, 1960, 
Document 391 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, volume 
XV, available at: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958–60v15/d391; and the “Editorial 
Note,” Document 392 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, 
volume XV, available at: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958–60v15/d392. 
125 “Editorial Note”/Document 392, available at: 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958–60v15/d392. 
 37 
The results of the American presidential election in November 1960—which 
ensconced the Democrat John F. Kennedy in the White House and portended a cooling in 
U.S.-Pakistan relations—only underscored Karachi’s sense of pending abandonment.126  
Pakistan’s neighbors and rivals took note, as well. In addition to the Soviets’ 
public histrionics, Pakistan faced recriminations from China, India, and Afghanistan for 
“bringing the Cold War to South Asia.”127  Pakistan found itself more or less on its own 
amid the tub-thumping, particularly among the “non-aligned.” Still seething, the Soviets 
settled the score with Pakistan by signing the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and 
Cooperation with India in August 1971,128 which emboldened India to help dismember 
Pakistan the same year.         
2. “A Privileged Position”: Losers and Winners in the Second Kashmir 
War  
The year 1964 opened with sectarian violence in South Asia of such scale that 
U.S. officials worried about a flood of refugees on both sides to rival the dislocations of 
1947 and 1950.129   The unrest began in Kashmir, “in late December when Kashmiri 
Muslims demonstrated over the theft of a relic of the Prophet.”130  Amid sensationalized 
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media reports and rabble-rousing from community leaders, the situation roiled the region, 
culminating in the second Kashmir war a year later.  
Kashmir formed a point of constant friction between India and Pakistan since 
independence; it also deformed relations with the United States, according to an article by 
President Ayub that appeared in Foreign Affairs in January 1964, just as the riots reached 
their violent crescendo.131   In a word, Kashmir became a hostage to Indian power 
politics in the region, the wedge that India meant to drive between Pakistan and a closer 
alliance with the United States.132  Ayub cited the correspondence, a decade earlier, 
between Nehru and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Mohammed Ali in which the Indian leader 
characterized U.S. military aid to Pakistan as “a qualitative change in the existing 
situation” with deleterious effects on “Indo-Pakistan relations, and, more especially, the 
Kashmir problem.”133  Specifically, the tenuous agreement on a plebiscite for Kashmir 
was off if Pakistan accepted American military aid in defiance of India’s aspirations for a 
non-aligned South Asia: “In May 1954, Pakistan went ahead with the signing of the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States. From that point on, the 
fact that the Indian Prime Minister would repudiate the joint communiqué on Kashmir 
became a foregone conclusion.”134   
The only thing that had changed, according to Ayub, was the U.S. view of the 
region. Where before “neutralism—’non-alignment’ as India prefers to call it—was 
suspect in American eyes,” now it represents something of a badge of honor.135   
“Indeed, some four years ago [with the advent of the Democratic Kennedy 
administration,] it gradually began to occupy, in American estimation, a privileged 
position.”136 
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Pakistan was disappointed as the United States did not provide the military 
assistance that Pakistan had expected in the light of defense agreements.137 According to 
Feroz Khan: 
During the war, Pakistan reached the United States and China. Its appeal 
to the United States did not fall on sympathetic ears and was referred to 
the United Nations instead. As if such a rebuff was not sufficient, on 
September 8, the Johnson administration decided to suspend military and 
economic aid to both India and Pakistan. An argument ensued between 
Ambassador McConoughy and Bhutto, as the latter accused Washington 
of poor treatment toward its ally by rewarding Indian aggression. 
McConoughy responded by questioning whether Pakistan had considered 
the consequences when it planned, organized, and supported guerilla 
operations in Kashmir. The next day, when the U.S. Congress passed the 
resolution to stop aid, Bhutto was bitter, concluding this “would mean that 
Pak-U.S. relations could not be the same again.” The U.S. decision was 
made simply to underscore its position that it would not become entangled 
in an India-Pakistan conflict.138 
As a matter of fact, India and Pakistan both faced the same restrictions on military 
aid—a compromise that allowed for the provision of “nonlethal equipment” and spare 
parts for equipment the United States had previously supplied (while some members of 
Congress agitated for the curtailment of all U.S. military aid). But Pakistan felt the pinch 
more as it was mostly reliant on such defense imports to offset its relatively weak 
indigenous capability. The threat remained just as real—as Pakistan discovered in 1971, 
when India intervened in the war that ultimately sheared Bangladesh off Pakistan. The 
seeming indifference of the U.S. stance during Pakistan’s hour of crisis disenchanted 
Pakistanis and put a question mark on U.S. reliability as an ally.139   
3. Tipping toward Pakistan, Opening to China 
The United States was still at war in Vietnam and China’s influence could help 
bring an end to the conflict. The United States recognized that Pakistan had established a 
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relationship with China and that communication channels through Pakistan were critical 
in opening a dialogue with Beijing. Bringing China into the global community as a world 
power to counterbalance the Soviet Union could advance détente and reduce the threat of 
nuclear war.140 U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Beijing in July 1971 
secretly via Pakistan with the blessings of Pakistani President General Yahya Khan. 
Kissinger acknowledged that in the absence of any other established communication 
channel with China at that time, Pakistan was the only opening that the United States 
could rely on.    
Nixon’s triumph in opening to China irritated the careerists in the State 
Department. Consequently, even when the Indian war on Pakistan was imminent by the 
end of 1971, the State Department refused to tow the White House line and, in fact, 
refused to believe reports of Indian war plans.141 The upshot for Pakistan was the too-
little-too-late parade-sail of the Enterprise and the unceremonious return of a policy, or at 
least a practice, of skepticism vis-à-vis Pakistan. When Congress, already at odds with 
the president over Vietnam and strongly inclined to remove the United States from as 
many “entangling alliances” as possible, got hold of the Watergate scandal, Nixon & Co. 
never had another chance to set up Pakistan to succeed (in the eyes of the career echelons 
in State, at least).   
4. The Nuclear Factor  
However, grateful the White House might have been for Pakistan’s good offices 
in the approach to China, Nixon’s State Department remained skeptical of Pakistan, much 
to the president’s irritation.142   For example, the spectacular discovery by Pakistani 
officials of a cache of several hundred Soviet-made submachine guns and other weapons 
in the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad in February 1973—presumably destined for the restive 
Baluchi tribes in Iran and Pakistan—aroused as much suspicion as relief: 
                                                 
 140 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 178–184. 
141 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, 857. 
142 Ibid. 
 41 
Recently, Pakistani officials have been complaining that the U.S. fails to 
appreciate the magnitude of the Soviet threat to U.S. interests in South 
Asia. Bhutto has asked the U.S. to review its interests in the area and to 
fashion a new relationship with Pakistan on the basis of its conclusions. 
Now, more than ever, he considers that Pakistan must reach a new security 
relationship with the U.S.. When Governor Khar (and possibly Bhutto) 
visit Washington next month, Pakistan can cite the Iraqi arms offenses as 
“proof” of their view of Soviet intentions.143  
While acknowledging the Iraqi Baath regime of arming separatists and other 
subversive groups in neighboring states, the department’s Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research emphasized the “windfall” that the event would provide to Pakistan’s President 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.  “So well does the Iraqi arms incident serve Bhutto’s purposes that 
the possibility of Pakistan’s provocation in the affair cannot be excluded.”144  The 
bureau’s report then quoted Afghan Prime Minister Muhammed Musa Shafiq, who had 
his own agenda vis-à-vis Pakistan, as saying that “the incident appears ‘too pat to fit.’”145  
Nixon and Kissinger wanted very much to resume military aid to Pakistan and 
rehabilitate relations U.S. relations with its on-again ally. In March 1973, Nixon 
approved the reinstatement of the policy of 1965–1971 that allowed for non-lethal 
military aid, to coincide with President Bhutto’s visit to Washington.146   As Kissinger 
noted at the time, “Pakistan must have a military force that can preserve internal integrity 
                                                 
142. See “Intelligence Note RNAN-9 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 
Washington, February 15, 1973,” Document 107 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, 
volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, available at: 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969–76ve08/d107.  
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. In contrast, see “Telegram 1606 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, 
February 24, 1973, 0652Z,” Document 109 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, volume 
E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, available at: 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969–76ve08/d109 .   Then Chargé d’Affairs ad interim 
Sidney Sober takes the Soviet connection much more seriously in this lengthy telegram. Though the subject 
line reads “Web of Speculation,” Sober does not impugn Pakistan’s motives at any point. In another 
communication the same day, Sober specifically rejects the BIR assessments. See “Telegram 1608 From 
the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 24, 1973, 0826Z,” Document 110 in Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, available 
at: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969–76ve08/d110. 
146 See “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to 
President Nixon, Washington, March 7, 1973,” Document 111 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1969–1976, volume E–8, Documents on South Asia, 1973–1976, available at: 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969–76ve08/d111. 
 42 
and permit Bhutto to negotiate with India from a basis that is as advantageous as the basic 
balance between the two countries permits. It is in the U.S. interest to help in any way we 
can to thwart subversion in Pakistan, whoever supports it. And it is in our interest to do 
what we can in response to ongoing Soviet supply to India.”147    
There were distinct limits on the White House’s enthusiasm: “We must, however, 
deal with the fact that resumption of full-scale military assistance would risk an almost 
certain congressionally imposed embargo. Thus, it would seem to me that a return to our 
1967–71 policy of limited supply is about as far as we can go.”148   Kissinger anticipated 
a negative reaction from India, but he had faith that the U.S. ambassador to India at the 
time, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, would, with some advance notice, be able to present the 
decision in the least unpalatable way.149  Even as the Watergate scandal occupied ever 
more of Washington’s attention, Pakistan seemed finally on the road to some semblance 
of the relationship with the United States to which it aspired. 
Then the South Asian rivalry went nuclear. India tested a “device” in May 1974, 
which galvanized efforts in Pakistan to maintain its own pace of development. In 1975, 
Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan managed to smuggle to Pakistan the gas centrifuge designs to 
which he had had access while working at the uranium enrichment facilities (URENCO) 
in Holland. Under his supervision significant developments were made in obtaining 
material and technology for developing uranium enrichment capabilities.150 This 
development only led to increased differences between the two governments, and the 
Carter administration finally put Pakistan under strict sanctions during 1976–1977.151  
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Compounding matters was the revelation from multiple reliable sources of 
Pakistan’s enrichment processing plant and procurement efforts. In a bid to foil the U.S. 
move to apply International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, Pakistan denied 
the existence of any such facility. Frustrated at Pakistani maneuvers on the nuclear issue, 
the United States resorted to sanctions under Symington Amendment, discontinuing all 
military and economic aid to Pakistan—approximately $85 million.152  President Carter 
attempted to defuse the growing threat of an Indo-Pak nuclear arms race by offering 
Pakistan fighter aircraft and civilian nuclear power plant as well as development 
assistance if existing facilities were opened to international safeguards. He made a similar 
offer to India. Both India and Pakistan refused.153   
5. The War in Afghanistan:  Realignment 
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, U.S.-Pakistan relations 
underwent a transformation. The United States dropped all sanctions and pledged a huge 
military, economic, and technical support package to counter the Soviet threat—the 
nightmare scenario that President Bhutto had outlined six-odd years earlier. U.S. funding 
grew from the initial sum of $35 million in 1982 to $600 million by 1987.154 As a reward 
for its unwavering cooperation, billions of dollars’ worth U.S. military and economic aid 
came Pakistan’s way, making it the second-largest recipient of the U.S. aid.155  Under 
another military ruler, General Zia ul Haq, offered his country’s full services for fighting 
the U.S. war against the Soviets in Afghanistan and presided over a steady flow of 
advanced military hardware to Pakistan. Its oft-maligned premier spy agency Inter-
Services Intelligence spearheaded the CIA-funded multi-billion-dollar covert operations 
against the Soviets during the 1980s.  
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Even during the U.S.-Pakistan partnership against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the 
relationship was strained due to Pakistan’s nuclear program. The United States repeatedly 
informed the Zia government that there would be serious consequences if Pakistan’s 
nuclear program continued. As the end of Afghanistan war came into sight, the United 
States suddenly roused itself to go beyond monitoring and reporting on Pakistan’s nuclear 
activities, and, due to its own strategic compulsions, decided to take some retributive 
measures against Pakistan. The U.S Congress passed the Pressler Amendment, which tied 
all types of aid to the condition that Pakistan would have to prove that the aid money it 
received from the United States was not being diverted in any way toward its nuclear 
weapons program.156 The Amendment required the U.S. president to certify Pakistan’s 
compliance—a difficult proposition considering Pakistan’s continued pursuit of its own 
nuclear weapon. Hence, Pakistan had to endure layers of U.S. sanctions during the 1990s  
6. The Sanctions 
During the U.S.-Pakistan partnership against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the 
relationship was strained due to Pakistan’s nuclear program. The United States repeatedly 
informed the Zia government that there would be serious consequence if Pakistan’s 
nuclear program continued. The United States also had little effect influencing India 
which was heavily engaged with the Soviets for assistance in their nuclear program. As 
the end of Afghanistan war came in sight, the United States that had not gone beyond 
monitoring/reporting Pakistan’s nuclear activities due to its own strategic compulsions, 
decided to take some retributive measures against Pakistan. The Pressler amendment 
passed by the U.S. Congress, tied all types of aid with the condition that Pakistan would 
have to prove with evidence that the aid money it received from the United States was not 
being diverted in any way toward its nuclear weapons program.157 The U.S. president 
would have to make this certification, which was a difficult proposition considering 
Pakistan’s continued nuclear pursuit. Hence, Pakistan had to endure layers of U.S. 




sanctions during the 1990s and especially after its overt nuclearization in a tit-for-tat 
response to nuclear explosions by its arch-rival India in May 1998. 
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III. THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
The end of the Cold War heralded a shift in U.S. relations with the major South 
Asian powers—though this change started out slowly and subtly. For one thing, the 
demise of the Soviet Union made nonalignment irrelevant and, thus, obviated a 
longstanding point of friction for U.S. policymakers. For another thing, the United States 
sought to recalibrate its strategic relations, which at least started a process of 
reassessment of allies and partners, including India and Pakistan. According to Pakistan’s 
leading scholar and its former ambassador to USA and UK, Dr. Maleeha Lodhi: “The end 
of the Cold War also persuaded the U.S. to re-evaluate and downgrade its relationship 
with Pakistan on the ground that the new global environment did not warrant the old 
strategic partnership.”158 
 Pakistan’s nuclear activities, which had only been noted with concern by the 
United States during the Afghanistan War (1979–1988), came under the spotlight after 
President Clinton came to power and made nuclear non-proliferation his key policy 
priority. According to Feroz Khan:  
By the mid-1990s … U.S.-Pakistani relations progressively soured over 
the nuclear question, and as Islamabad felt isolated under sanctions, 
greater national consensus and harmony within the domestic political 
leadership emerged over the national commitment to acquire the nuclear 
deterrent. Despite this sense of isolation, it was India’s aborted attempt to 
conduct a nuclear test in 1995 that determined the Pakistani pathway to its 
own nuclear tests.159  
During the next few years, despite concerted U.S. efforts to dissuade India and 
Pakistan from conducting the nuclear explosions, India did just that on May 11, 1998. In 
the face of enhanced Indian belligerence and U.S. offer of carrots (and sticks) over the 
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next two weeks, Pakistan followed suit by going overtly nuclear on May 28, 1998.160 
Thereafter, both United States and India had to—or at least had the chance to— 
reconsider their relations with Pakistan.     
On the other hand, the habits of thought and vision from the previous era 
persisted, limiting the scope and scale of the change. These old notions colored U.S. 
policy vis-à-vis both states at least as much as current events did, particularly once the 
Global War on Terror arrived in the region. In the period from 1991 to the present, the 
relationship between the United States and India, as well as U.S.-Pakistan relations 
seemed to find a new basis. However, a closer analysis reveals that it has been more a 
story of missed opportunities than fulfilled promises. 
A. INDIA AFTER THE COLD WAR: CHANGE OF FORTUNES  
U.S.-India security ties got their first boost in 1991 with the visit to India by the 
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Pacific Command, Lt. General Claude Kicklighter. The 
visit marked the beginning of a new, bilateral strategic relationship and resulted, most 
immediately, in the so-called Kicklighter proposals, which included service-to-service 
exchanges and expansion of a defense cooperation framework.161 Enhanced 
understanding between the two militaries paved the way for the first-ever U.S.-India 
military exercises in line with the U.S. policy of “cooperative engagement” with friendly 
militaries. In February 1992, Indian and U.S. Army and Air Force paratroopers held their 
first joint training exercise, codenamed Teak Iroquois.  
Since February 1992, these exercises have continued with ever-increasing 
scope.162 The two navies conduct four bilateral exercises annually: Malabar, Habu Naag, 
Spitting Cobra, and Salvex. Exercises Yudh Abhyas and Shatrujeet are conducted 
between the two armies and the U.S. Marines annually, whereas, Exercise Cope India is 
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conducted bi-annually between the two air forces. The first cycles of these exercises 
culminated in the January 2004 announcement of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership 
(NSSP),163 which included cooperation in the fields of nuclear safety, space technology, 
and high-tech U.S. exports to India.164   
In January 1995, the Agreed Minutes of Defense Relations, which were aimed at 
strengthening as well as expanding defense cooperation to meet the requirements of the 
new post-Cold War world, were signed between the two countries. There was divergence 
in interpretation of the Minutes by the two sides, as the Indians saw it as an opening into 
the U.S. arms market. On the other hand, the Americans stressed that sale of arms or 
transfer of defense technology was not a part of the agreement, which to Washington was 
basically meant for enhancing cooperation in defense research and development 
(R&D).165 Moreover, the Agreed Minutes expressly specified that no arms/technology 
transfer would be done to Pakistan’s detriment. Despite these differing views, as a 
follow-up measure, it was agreed to set up the Defense Policy Group (DPG) as an inter-
governmental body between the two ministries of defense. Defense cooperation was 
sought not only at the ministerial level but also at the service level as well as at the R&D 
organizations level.166  
Despite all these historic positive developments, the Indians have been wary that 
the continued supply of U.S. military hardware might be jeopardized if political 
differences between India and United States arise in future. “Nevertheless, the value of 
new and unprecedented major defense sales to India has continued to grow—some $8 
billion in deals since 2001—with the United States now offering to sell India some of its 
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most sophisticated military hardware.”167 Some of the major defense sales/deals to India 
are: 
a. Six C-130J-30 Hercules Transport aircraft for Indian Special 
Forces ($962 million) 
b. Ten C-17A Globe Master Transport aircraft ($4.1 billion) 
c. Eight P-8A Poseidon ASW aircraft ($2 billion) 
d. 512 CBU-97 SFW Guided bombs ($258 million) 
e. 17 F404 Turbofan for Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) produced in 
India ($105 million)168 
By virtue of combined military exercises and acquisition of choice military 
hardware from the United States, Indian military got a welcome break from the 
Soviet/Russian legacy and systems. It also got invaluable exposure to relatively more 
advanced U.S. military concepts and practices. Consequently, by breaking the Pakistani 
military’s monopoly in terms of U.S.-Pakistan defense cooperation, Indians got into a 
better position to menace Pakistan.       
1. The Nuclear Brink: the Kargil Conflict 
In the summer of 1999, the Indian and Pakistani militaries came eyeball-to-
eyeball when Pakistani soldiers disguised as Kashmiri mujahedeen (freedom fighters) 
infiltrated across the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kargil sector of Indian-Occupied 
Kashmir (IOK).169 The Indian Army was totally surprised, indeed shocked, to find the 
intruders in occupation of the alpine posts that the Indians had vacated as a matter of 
routine at the onset of the typically harsh winter season. Even as the occupiers ran out of 
logistics, the posts had to be re-occupied at a huge cost in men and material, including the 
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active support of the Indian Air Force.170 The ensuing conflict—a “half war” in some 
estimates—spanned almost six weeks, was and was viewed by the international 
community as a serious risk to regional stability, as it brought the two nuclear powers on 
the brink of nuclear confrontation.171 (In the event, the Kargil conflict was the first 
bilateral conflict that occurred after the overt nuclearization of South Asia in 1998.) 
Why the conflict remained limited is explained by the two competing but equally 
convincing narratives. The optimistic narrative propounded by Sumit Ganguly, an 
eminent South Asia and nuclear expert, attributes it to the nuclear deterrence.172  In 
contrast, the pessimistic narrative presented by Paul Kapur, another eminent South Asia 
and nuclear expert, attributes it to such other factors as the restraint shown by India and 
U.S. pressure aimed at containing the situation.173  Either way, nuclear equipoise figured 
significantly in India’s response in the Kargil conflict. 
President Clinton’s Democratic administration in Washington was deeply worried 
over the developments. Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and her aides got 
engaged in hectic diplomatic efforts to diffuse the crisis. They squarely blamed Pakistan 
for initiating the crisis and asked India to exercise restraint by not escalating the conflict 
by retaliating at other points along the LoC or across the Indo-Pak International 
Border.174 According to Strobe Talbott, who was serving at the time as Albright’s deputy 
secretary of State: “The United States condemned Pakistan’s infiltration of armed 
intruders … . In late June, Clinton called Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistani Prime Minister, to 
stress that the United States saw Pakistan as the aggressor and to reject the fiction that the 
fighters were really separatist guerrillas.”175 In the face of growing diplomatic pressure, 
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Nawaz Sharif visited Washington in the first week of July. After prolonged parleys 
between the two sides, he agreed to withdraw troops from Kargil on the promise that 
Clinton would take a personal interest in encouraging India and Pakistan to resolve their 
bilateral disputes.176   The neutral American stance during the conflict helped allay Indian 
suspicions about a U.S. tilt toward Pakistan to quite an extent. According to leading 
South Asia security experts, Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “Clinton’s actions were 
significant because they demonstrated to India that the United States was not blind to 
Pakistani malfeasance and that it would not necessarily support its traditional ally at 
India’s expense.”177  
This outcome was not quite what Pakistan had hoped to achieve. Pakistan’s 
Kargil adventure was brilliant at the tactical level as it totally surprised the Indians; had it 
been successful, it could have cut off the strategically significant Ladakh region 
(adjoining China) from rest of IOK. At the strategic level, however, the operation was a 
disaster, as Pakistan emerged as an aggressor.178 What had been aimed at thawing the 
Kashmir issue, ended up thawing the formerly frosty relations between the United States 
and India, to the detriment of Pakistan.  
2. Yes, but … : The Indian Response after 9/11 
India was quick to offer unconditional support including its bases to the United 
States for launching operations against Al Qaeda. Although the United States preferred 
Pakistan’s services in this regard mainly for geographical reasons, India’s offer went a 
long way toward strengthening and broadening the scope of U.S.-India defense 
relations.179 In the event, the U.S. government immediately lifted all sanctions on India, 
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as well as Pakistan, that had been imposed mainly due to their nuclear proliferation 
activities.180  
When it came to sending Indian troops to join coalition forces in Iraq in 2003, 
India demurred, citing the lack of domestic political consensus. The Indian public was 
not in favor of committing Indian forces to take casualties at the behest of U.S. forces, 
which seemed to have bogged down in Iraq.181 This Indian response frustrated the 
Americans, who had hoped that Indian troops might relieve some U.S. forces so the 
Pentagon could send them home.182 The U.S. response was swaddled in typical 
diplomatic jargon, but the “U.S. State Department has let it be known that there is an 
element of disappointment and that it did not agree with New Delhi’s argument that the 
lack of a clear-cut United Nations mandate prevented it from participating in the so-
called stabilization of Iraq.”183 The Indians took the American rebuke, however glancing, 
to heart but also fell back on the half-century-plus-old habit of going its own way. Former 
Indian army Chief General V.P. Malik commented: “India’s domestic political 
constraints might produce outcomes that run counter to U.S. expectations. Without 
adequate understanding of such political factors in the two nations, there will always be a 
danger of a derailment of defense ties.”184   
Other long-standing concerns reasserted themselves, as well. After the 2007 
Malabar naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal stoked Chinese concerns, India reportedly 
curtailed these types of multilateral exercises. Indian officials apparently fear that such 
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moves could provoke China and that the United States would not back India in a 
meaningful way if conflict were to erupt between New Delhi and Beijing.185  
Building on its earlier role in reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, India is 
keen on enhancing its footprint there. India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement 
signed in October 2011, which was lauded by the United States, stands as an evidence of 
growing Indo-Afghan relations. Under the agreement, Afghan security forces would be 
trained in India.186 Pakistan’s security establishment considers the Indian presence in 
Afghanistan detrimental to its interests as its amounts to encirclement by the Indian 
influence in its backyard.187 The dubious activities by a chain of Indian consulates in 
eastern Afghanistan along Pak-Afghan border, ironically established to facilitate India’s 
development activities mostly taking place in the west of the country, fuel Pakistani 
suspicions about the real Indian intent. The new U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel 
came under fire during his confirmation hearings for his speech at Oklahoma’s Cameron 
University in 2011 that India “financed problems” for Pakistan in Afghanistan.188        
Despite encouragement by the United States, India is wary of enhancing its active 
military presence in Afghanistan as it still remembers the catastrophic experience of 
sending its troops to Sri Lanka in the 1980s. However, India has shared with Afghanistan, 
high level military advisors and personnel from its super spy agency: Research and 
Analysis Wing (RAW). According to Pakistani security establishment, this Indian 
military/intelligence presence in Afghanistan will place India in a position to foment 
further trouble in its restive Baluchistan province. Pakistan’s interior minister, Rehman 
Malik, squarely blamed India and Afghanistan of sponsoring the Baluch insurgents.189  
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Considering the unending dispute between India and Pakistan and attendant 
legacy of deep-seated mistrust bordering hatred, post-2014 Afghanistan will present itself 
as a strategic battleground between the internal stake holders and their external sponsors 
especially India and Pakistan. This likely future scenario in Afghanistan is already 
causing concerns in the Western capitals as it might not only hinder stability in 
Afghanistan but might also cause instability in entire South Asia. In the same context, 
according to Sumit Ganguly, “The prospects of any imminent diplomatic breakthrough 
that might enable the two sides to reach a modus vivendi on their respective positions in 
Afghanistan seem rather doubtful.”190 This is the issue on which U.S. quest and Indian 
obsession to have U.S.-India relations delinked or de-hyphenated from U.S.-Pakistan 
relations would be seriously challenged.            
3. The Prize: the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal 
On July 18, 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh announced their intent to forge a civilian nuclear deal.   On October 1, 
2008, the U.S. Senate formally approved the deal, which bestowed upon India de jure 
status of a nuclear weapon state and entitled it to enjoy all the perks and privileges that 
come with this status, even though India was still not a signatory to the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.191 The deal ensured uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel to India by 
the United States and other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It also allowed U.S. 
firms to trade with India in nuclear materials and those technologies required to set up 
and run the civil nuclear facilities.192 According to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for 
South Asia Robert Blake, “U.S. firms could also get a significant part of the $40-billion 
commercial nuclear sector as India invests in 14 new power reactors in the next five 
years.”193    
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Despite the Bush Administration’s optimism about the strategic dividends—in 
terms of further strengthening U.S.-India relations—of this deal and the multi-billion-
dollar nuclear trade for the U.S. companies, it was apparent to many observers that the 
agreement might seriously undermine the nuclear deterrence regime in South Asia.194 
India was keen to secure a guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel based on its previous bad 
experience of U.S. blockage in the aftermath of India’s “peaceful” nuclear test in 1974.195 
Because the external supply of nuclear fuel for its civilian nuclear reactors is assured 
under the U.S.-India nuclear deal, India would be in a position to divert its surplus 
indigenous fissile material toward its nuclear weapons program.196   
In a sense, then, the U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal is, for India, a license to split 
atoms—and amass weapons. Leading South Asia and nuclear policy experts Paul Kapur 
and Sumit Ganguly commented: “By allowing India access to a ready international 
supply of civilian nuclear fuel, the deal could enable the Indian’s to use their scarce 
indigenous uranium supplies to expand their nuclear weapons arsenal. This could lead to 
Pakistani and Chinese balancing behavior, possibly destabilizing South Asia.”197  
According to Zia Mian and M. V. Ramana: “India is believed to have a stockpile of 
perhaps 40–50 nuclear weapons, with fissile material stocks for as many more, and plans 
that reportedly involve an arsenal of 300–400 weapons within a decade.”198   
  
4. India: Recognition without Responsibility  
 
India is basking in the glory of quasi de jure status of a Nuclear Weapons State 
and relishing the benevolence of the United States. However, in the bargain, it has also 
conceded the nuclear status to Pakistan though more by default than design. Hence, 
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Pakistan is in a position now to sufficiently affect the way that India does business on the 
border, even when things get ugly. But India now gets to sit at the high-stakes table 
among the other major nuclear powers without having to sign the NPT. Though the aid 
from Washington is flowing to Delhi faster than ever before, but the Americans continue 
to view India in the zero-sum hysterics of the early Cold War. The United States 
accommodates a lot of Indian misbehavior rather than risk offending and ultimately 
“losing” it. India plays a much more nuanced game in its relations not only with the 
United States but also with China and even Russia. India is more or less reveling in the 
benefits of major-power status without really stepping up to the restraints and 
responsibilities that go with it. 
B. PAKISTAN AFTER THE COLD WAR: THE SAME OLD STORY  
In stark contrast to the blossoming of U.S.-Indian defense relations after the Cold 
War, U.S. Pakistan relations, at least as measured by foreign aid, reached a fateful nadir 
in 1990, when President George H.W. Bush suspended aid to Pakistan when he declined 
to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon.199 The United States generally 
sought to disengage from Pakistan (as it also did with Afghanistan, following the Soviet 
collapse) and to curtail foreign aid outlays, which left little impetus to improve the state 
of affairs between the two countries. Pakistan’s overt nuclearization in May 1998—in a 
tit-for-tat response to India—only aggravated U.S. reservations about Pakistan’s nuclear 
ambitions, and resulted in further sanctions200 Pakistan spent the better part of the 1990s 
seething about the U.S. “abandonment.”201 
Then everything changed dramatically at the turn of the century.202 Pakistan 
assumed the role of a frontline state in the GWOT and opened a number of its military 
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bases and its airspace for U.S. operations. It also made its port facilities and overland 
communication infrastructure available for the smooth flow of logistics to NATO/ISAF 
forces in Afghanistan.203    The U.S.-Pakistan alliance picked up more or less where it 
had left off—for better or worse. 
1. The Nuclear Counterpoint 
One point of contention concerned Pakistan’s nuclear activities, which cut to the 
heart of Pakistani national self-image. Successful conduct of the nuclear explosions was 
officially described as “Pakistan’s finest hour.” “Others boasted that Pakistan had become 
the world’s seventh nuclear power and the first nuclear weapons state in the Islamic 
World.”204 Actually, that achievement meant much than just a sense of pride and boost to 
the self-image of the Pakistani nation. According to Dr. Rifaat Hussain, an eminent 
Pakistani scholar at the Stanford University, “[N]uclear weapons are central to Pakistani 
strategic thought, especially with regard to deterring India from initiating large-scale 
military operations against Pakistan.”205       
In a stark contrast to extra-ordinary nuclear cooperation between the United States 
and India over the last few years, Pakistan has almost been declared a “nuclear pariah” 
mainly due to proliferation activities of A.Q. Khan Network.206  Although, A.Q. Khan 
admitted his responsibility, he maintained that the government of Pakistan had had no 
direct involvement in his “nuclear black market.” Considering the fact that he had been 
given complete autonomy over Pakistan’s nuclear program, A.Q. Khan’s alibi for the 
government had some merit but no one in the world was ready to listen to this 
argument.207  The reluctance to absolve the Pakistani state could also be attributed to lack 
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of understanding about its security culture, especially the nuclear side of it. Either way, 
when Pakistan asked for an agreement with the United States similar to the deal that India 
had secured, the request was turned down on the basis of Pakistan’s alleged nuclear 
proliferation.208   
At the same time, Chinese support for Pakistan’s peaceful nuclear energy program 
has also been vilified,209 disregarding the fact that Pakistan is facing an acute shortage of 
electricity, which has badly affected its civic facilities and brought its industry to its 
knees.210 Pakistan’s desperate quest to import gas from neighboring Iran was scuttled 
first by India’s walking out of the IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India) gas-pipeline agreement. Now 
further progress on the Iran-Pakistan version of the project may stall under the threat of 
U.S. sanctions.211  Meanwhile, India annually does some $14 billion worth of direct trade 
with Iran, a major portion of which comprises petroleum exports to India—with U.S. 
blessings in the form of legal waivers.212         
2. Pakistan Steps up after 9/11 
 Initially, Pakistan tried to negotiate handover of Osama bin Laden to the United 
States, failing which, it agreed to extend all logistic and operational facilities including its 
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bases to facilitate U.S./ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.213 According 
to Pakistan’s then-President Musharraf, the government was coerced to extend its 
cooperation in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan.214  Certainly the United States 
produced its ripest and most irresistible carrots. As an incentive for Pakistan, a bill to 
repeal the Pressler and Glenn amendments was introduced in the U.S. Congress, to 
remove all sanctions against Pakistan.215 Pakistan was declared a major non-NATO ally 
(MNNA) in 2003, which paved its way for advanced military purchases from the U.S. 
And as an additional goodwill gesture, U.S. wrote off a $1 billion loan to Pakistan.216  
Pakistan committed a large part of its paramilitary and military forces to fight al 
Qaeda and the Taliban in its northwestern Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 
which adjoin Afghanistan.217 Some of these army formations were moved to FATA from 
Pakistan’s highly sensitive eastern border with India. Even the elements of Pakistan 
Army’s elite strategic reserves, which are moved only in case of imminent war, were 
employed in GWOT. By 2011, about 150,000 military and paramilitary troops had been 
engaged in this campaign.218  
The Pakistan Army, with direct support from the Pakistan Air Force, succeeded in 
clearing most of FATA except for the North Waziristan Agency (NWA). However, those 
active military operations against the tenacious al Qaeda and Taliban fighters, spanning 
some years, did not come without a cost. Pakistan Army and paramilitary forces were 
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over-stretched219 after prolonged operations in FATA, which themselves had entailed 
significant human and material losses.220  Over the last eleven years, of this state of war 
with al Qaeda and Taliban, Pakistani military and security forces casualties outnumber 
the casualties of NATO and ISAF combined.221   
According to an economic survey recently released by the Pakistani government, 
Pakistan has sacrificed more than 3,500 security personnel to the conflict. At the same 
time, the direct and indirect costs of GWOT incurred by Pakistan amounted to $67.93 
billion.222  The enormous social costs attributable to the GWOT cannot be calculated. 
“Some three million people had been displaced because of fighting inside Pakistan. The 
relief and rehabilitation of the internally displaced people had cost $600 million.”223 
During 2008–2009 alone, the Taliban had destroyed close to 500 schools in Swat and 
FATA regions of northwest Pakistan.224 
3. The Irritants on All Sides 
Despite unprecedented security cooperation between the two countries post-9/11, 
there have been some irritants in the last few years that have threatened to derail the 
entire edifice. For example, the United States wanted Pakistan to launch operations in 
NWA, where remnants of al Qaeda and elements of the Haqqani Group of anti-U.S. 
Afghan Taliban were believed to be hiding and carrying out bloody attacks against 
U.S./ISAF forces in Afghanistan. Annoyed by Pakistan’s purported reluctance to take on 
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the Haqqanis, the United States resorted to diplomatic and military pressure on 
Pakistan.225   
What further complicated the situation was Pakistan’s stance that despite its 
persistent pleas, U.S./ISAF forces were not keen on targeting Pakistani Taliban who had 
taken refuge in north-eastern Afghanistan after being flushed out of Pakistan’s north-
western tribal regions.226  Those elements had been involved in audacious attacks against 
Pakistani security forces from across the Pak-Afghan border. Since 2004, United States 
had mounted strikes by unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV), commonly known as 
“drones,” against terrorist sanctuaries in FATA. This campaign was intensified in 
2010/2011 apparently after Washington’s disappointment with Pakistan’s approach to 
continued military operations in FATA.227 The claims and counter claims as to the 
complicity of Pakistan’s security establishment and innocent civilian casualties 
notwithstanding, such attacks have caused widespread resentment against the United 
States in the Pakistani public.228    
A shadow of doubt has been repeatedly cast on the sincerity of Pakistani military 
in targeting the terrorists across the board. On occasions, the Pakistan Army has been 
castigated for tipping certain Taliban factions about impending U.S./ISAF attacks against 
them.229 What has really deepened the mistrust between the two militaries has been a 
couple of U.S. air strikes on Pakistani security forces—strikes that, although officially 
chalked up to miscalculation or faulty intelligence, appeared to be deliberate. The first 
such attack happened in June 2008 and resulted in a dozen casualties among Pakistan’s 
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paramilitary forces.230 The second and more alarming attack was launched in November 
2011, when a regular Pakistan Army unit, deployed to interdict a Taliban infiltration 
route at Salala on the Pak-Afghan border. The entire unit was massacred by the U.S. 
gunships aircraft, resulting in two dozen casualties, including a couple of officers.231 A 
few weeks after the incident, U.S. military investigation claimed that “there was no 
intentional effort,” whereas Pakistani military investigation claimed that the incident was 
“deliberate at some level.”232 In any case, the gory incident further increased misgivings 
between the two countries.  
Pakistani reaction to the latter incident was understandably so vehement that the 
U.S. forces were asked to vacate Pakistan’s western Shamsi air base.233 The logistics for 
U.S./ISAF forces in Afghanistan, commonly known as NATO supplies, which are land-
routed through Pakistan, were also suspended. Shamsi air base was vacated within a few 
weeks. Pakistan allowed the NATO supplies to resume plying its territory after hectic 
negotiations spanning over more than six months and after a muted, and much-delayed, 
apology by the United States.234  
Another incident that dented U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation—as indeed their 
overall bilateral relations—was the U.S. Special Forces’ clandestine attack on Osama bin 
Laden’s hideout in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad on May 2, 2011.235 Operation 
Geronimo entailed two helicopters full of U.S. SEALs entering Pakistan’s sovereign 
territory without warning, consultation, or permission. Bin Laden was killed and so was 
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any remaining element of trust between the two security establishments as the Pakistani 
side had not been taken into confidence.236  Worse, the Pakistani security forces felt that 
their competence and their ability to defend Pakistan’s sovereignty was seriously 
questioned domestically and hence they were deeply embarrassed.237 In June 2012, then-
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta justified the unilateral U.S. strike by saying that the 
United States was losing patience with Pakistan due to its ambivalence in GWOT.238  
Such irresponsible statements only added fuel to the fire—and credence to popular 
Pakistani resentment over being “used and abandoned” by the United States once again.   
4. The Ebb and Flow and Ebb of Aid 
Since Pakistan was impressed into service in GWOT, it has received about $20 
billion in various forms of military/non-military aid from the United States.239 However, 
the aid has come with strings attached. The infamous Kerry-Lugar Bill of 2009240 made 
$7.5 billion in non-military aid to Pakistan contingent on its military command’s 
acceptance of certain humiliating conditions.241 For example, one condition required: 
“The security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the 
political or judicial processes of Pakistan.”242 The principal at issue in this demand was 
entirely correct, but the condition itself amounted to direct interference in Pakistan’s 
internal affairs. Additionally, like an undead relation of the Pressler Amendment, the 
Kerry-Lugar Bill also stipulated that the release of funds to Pakistan would be subject to 
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certification by the U.S. Secretary of State that elements of Pakistan’s military and 
intelligence agencies were not supporting terrorist groups targeting U.S./ISAF forces in 
Afghanistan. 
Then for hiding Osama bin Laden in its territory, Pakistan saw the United States 
suspend $800 million aid.243 Even such Pakistan-friendly voices as Senator John Kerry 
chimed in, urging Pakistan to show resolve in eliminating terrorist hideouts from its 
territory.244 In May 2012, U.S. lawmakers unanimously suspended the $650 million due 
to Pakistan in Coalition Support Fund (CSF) unless and until Pakistan reopened its 
territory to the NATO supplies.245 During the same deliberations, the U.S. Senate 
proposed to cut aid to Pakistan drastically if Pakistan’s commitment to the GWOT came 
into further question.246   
On the other hand, a positive development in U.S.-Pakistan relations, even amid 
such acrimony, has been their continued defense ties in terms of U.S. sales of 
sophisticated military hardware to Pakistan and a few combined/joint military exercises. 
After the lifting of the U.S. sanctions after 9/11, Pakistan has received billions of dollars’ 
worth of Foreign Military Sales. The latest version (Block 50/52) of F-16s and mid-life 
upgrade of earlier versions along with state of the art weaponry is the “crown jewel” in 
this revived military cooperation. Apart from being an operational boost for Pakistan, this 
supply of the latest F-16s also has immense politico-diplomatic significance against the 
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backdrop of Pakistan’s quarter-century-old grievance about the cancellation of a similar 
deal.247  
“The Pentagon reports total Foreign Military Sales agreements with Pakistan 
worth $5.4 billion for FY2002-FY2010 (in process sales of F-16 combat aircraft and 
related equipment account for more than half of this).”248 Major post-2001 defense 
supplies paid for with Foreign Military Funding (FMF) include the following: 
a. Eight P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft and their refurbishment 
(valued at $474 million) 
b.  About 5,250 TOW anti-armor missiles ($186 million; 2,007 
delivered) 
c. Six C-130E transport aircraft and their refurbishment ($76 million, 
all delivered and in operation) 
d. 20 AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters granted under EDA, then 
refurbished ($48 million, 12 delivered, 8 pending refurbishment for up to $115 million 
more).249 
Supplies paid for with a mix of Pakistani national funds (PNF) and FMF include: 
a. Up to 60 mid-life update kits for F-16A/B combat aircraft (valued 
at $891 million, with at least $335 million of this in FMF; Pakistan’s current plans are to 
purchase 46 of these) 
Notable items paid for entirely with PNF include: 
a. 18 new F-16C/D Block 50/52 combat aircraft, with an option for 
18 more (valued at $1.43 billion) 
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b. F-16 armaments including 500 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles; 
1,450 2,000-pound bombs; 500 JDAM bomb tail kits; and 1,600 Enhanced Paveway 
laser-guided bomb kits ($667 million) 
c. 100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles ($298 million, 88 delivered).250 
In 2007, the Pentagon started to fund counter-terrorism training and equipment for 
the Frontier Corps (FC), which is responsible for security in Pakistani provinces 
bordering Afghanistan. More of Pakistan Army’s elite Special Service Group 
commandos and Army Air Assault units were trained and equipped to move quickly to 
find and target terrorist elements.251  “U.S.-funded military education and training 
programs seek to enhance the professionalism of Pakistan’s military leaders. At least 
2,000 Pakistani officers have received such training since 2001.”252   
In 2010, a squadron of PAF F-16 aircraft flew to Nellis AFB in Nevada and 
participated in Exercise “Red Flag” with the U.S. Air Force. The two air forces also 
conducted a joint air-air refueling exercise in Pakistan, the same year. Earlier, Exercise 
“Falcon Talon” had been held in Pakistan in 2005 and 2009.253  Meanwhile, Pakistan’s 
Navy has been an active member of the U.S.-led Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 
(counter-terrorism) and CTF 151 (counter-piracy). Pakistani flag officers have already 
commanded the task forces three times.254     
 Despite some serious misunderstandings that developed between the two 
militaries over the last couple of years, continued military-military cooperation is like a 
silver lining over the dark cloud. It is significant considering the prominent role played 
by the security establishments in the two countries. At the strategic level, it is quite 
assuring as it means that this relationship has not yet reached the end of the road yet. It 
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might just be a fork, leaving the option open for both the parties to take the right way to 
continue to destination: security and stability in South Asia. At the operational level, 
supply of latest version of F-16 aircraft (though limited in number) along with advanced 
weaponry, has given Pakistan a slight edge over India until it operationalizes its newly 
purchased Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). After that happens in the 
next couple of years, Pakistan will be forced to seek more advanced aircraft from the 
United States—failing which, it will not be left with any other option than to explore 




IV. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
After having fought the GWOT in the Afghanistan Theater for more than a 
decade, the bulk of U.S./NATO forces are set to wind up their operations and leave the 
region by the end of 2014. In the overall context and by any measure, they have had 
mixed success in this prolonged campaign. They have been able to eliminate some of Al 
Qaeda’s top leadership, including most especially Osama bin Laden. However, remaining 
elements of Al-Qaeda have escaped to countries like Somalia, Yemen, and Mali. The 
Taliban are also resurgent, and they have managed to bring the U.S. and its Allies to the 
negotiating table in Afghanistan. And then there is the sheer cost of the intervention.  
“The Congressional Research Office estimates that the war cost the United States $443 
billion between 2001 and 2011. More than 2,000 Americans have been killed and more 
than 17,000 injured.”255  
Defense cooperation by the regional U.S. allies, mainly Pakistan, has been key in 
the success (to whatever degree) of this campaign. India, not very keen to fight GWOT 
despite claiming to be a victim of terrorism, opted to stay on the sidelines militarily. It 
assumed the role of training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 
under the auspices of the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed by Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh and President Hamid Karzai on October 4, 2012. In order to keep the 
Indian trainers out of harm’s way, this training is being conducted in India, which has not 
suffered any military casualties in GWOT. Pakistan, on the other hand has invested 
precious blood and treasure in fighting the GWOT.  
Through 2011, Pakistan had lost more than 3500 security personnel in counter-
terrorism operations and a result of retaliatory terrorist attacks on them. The direct and 
indirect economic costs were upwards of U.S. $67 billion; enormous social costs cannot 
be measured.256  Despite all these sacrifices, doubts have been repeatedly raised about 
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Pakistan’s sincerity in GWOT. Its sovereignty has been routinely violated by the drone 
strikes in its northwestern FATA area. Unilateral action by the U.S. Special Forces, deep 
inside Pakistan, to kill Osama bin Laden added insult to injury, bin Laden’s terrorist 
credentials notwithstanding. The United States is on its way out of Afghanistan, and its 
security relations with Pakistan are clearly on a downward trajectory. Ironically, despite 
India’s minimal direct involvement in GWOT, U.S.-India security relations are on an 
upward trajectory. This trend in two sets of relations is likely to have deep impact on the 
regional security situation. In the meantime, the potential for future Indo-Pakistan 
conflicts persists. What does the future portend for South Asia and U.S. defense 
cooperation there?            
A. U.S.-INDIA DEFENSE COOPERATION 
Amid the current rush of good feeling, the U.S. image in India, like the Indian 
image in the United States, has undergone a positive change. However, mistrust and 
reservations, especially on the Indian side, which were rooted in the Cold War legacy, 
still tend to cast long shadows.257 According to a restricted study carried out for the U.S. 
Department of Defense in October 2002 and based on the assessment of U.S. diplomatic 
and military elite: “Indian bureaucrats, Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals could be 
‘easily slighted or insulted’, are ‘difficult to work with’, harbor ‘deep-seated distrust’ of 
Americans, are mostly ‘obsessed’ with history than future and ‘see the world through 
their perennial distrust of Pakistan.’”258  
1. Two Visions of Technology and Arms Sales 
“For one, India remains skeptical that the U.S. would actually defend core Indian 
interests in the face of Chinese aggression. It sees U.S. involvement in the region as 
fundamentally self-serving, with the transactional arrangement between the U.S. and 
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Pakistan constituting the case-in-point.”259  Even unusually bold U.S. policy moves to 
relax export controls on defense equipment to India are not likely to make the Indians as 
comfortable as they are with the Russian equipment, less for its quality than for its 
assured availability.260  Indeed, India’s decades-old defense relationship with the 
erstwhile USSR and now Russia, mainly restricted to the acquisition of Soviet/Russian 
military equipment on soft financial terms, colors all of India’s expectations of defense 
cooperation.261  
During the Cold War, there was little more to the Soviet-Indian relationship than 
the steady flow of equipment, despite the Indo-Soviet bilateral Treaty of Peace, 
Friendship, and Cooperation, signed in 1971. Article II of the treaty obliged the parties to 
“declare their determination to continue their efforts to preserve and to strengthen peace 
in Asia and throughout the world, to halt the arms race and to achieve general and 
complete disarmament, including both nuclear and conventional, under effective 
international control.”262 In practice, USSR/Russia armed India to its teeth in the 
conventional domain and overlooked its nuclear ambitions.  
Article IX of the Treaty provided for joint efforts if either of the parties came 
under attack. However, when it came to openly supporting India in face of U.S. 
diplomacy and Chinese military pressure favoring Pakistan, the “Soviets continued to 
behave in a most circumspect fashion in dealing with the crisis in East Pakistan.”263 On 
the other hand, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, the Indians 
were slow to condemn the action—not so much out of sympathy to their military 
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benefactor but rather out of concern about the supply of U.S. weapons to Pakistan to 
counter the Soviet invasion.   
In recent years, the Indian Air Force (IAF) was driven to acquire a fleet of 
MMRCA, which case study provides an insight in to Indian approach when it comes to 
defense decision-making. The deal under consideration would be worth U.S. $11 billion, 
making it the world’s biggest international combat aircraft deal in two decades. Because 
the current IAF is outfitted mostly with Russian aircraft and a few squadrons of French 
aircraft, the natural choice for the new acquisitions seemed to be Russia or France. With 
the burgeoning of U.S.-Indian defense cooperation, however, U.S. aircraft like the F-16 
and the F-18 also could have been strong contenders. According to Teresita C. Schaffer, 
“It had been regarded in the United States not just as a commercial bonanza at a time of 
economic distress, but also as the opportunity to introduce a new level of operational and 
strategic understanding into the growing India-U.S. defense relationship.”264    
The Indians thought otherwise. “The IAF was understandably wary when in 2005 
Lockheed offered it the F-16 fighter. Former Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis … pointed 
out that reliability of support when the chips are down outweighs any other 
consideration.”265 In the end, India opted for the French Rafale. The IAF justified its 
decision in purely practical terms. “The Air Force was focusing on getting an aircraft that 
would be superior, and the American aircraft on offer just didn’t cut it,” said Rahul Roy-
Chaudhury, the senior fellow for South Asia at the International Institute of Strategic 
Studies.266  
The decision came as such a shock that the U.S. ambassador to New Delhi 
resigned. (Publically, he cited “previous personal obligations,” but the conspicuous 
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timing of Timothy Roemer’s resignation attracted plenty of comment in India.267)   The 
United States lost out not only on a multi-billion dollar deal but also on an opportunity to 
foster closer cooperation with the IAF.  
In contrast, during the period 2006–2010, Russian military equipment constituted 
82 percent of total Indian defense imports. A $3.33-billion deal for an additional 42 
Russian Su 30 aircraft was inked in 2010.268 India has already shown interest in joint 
ventures like Medium Transport Aircraft Development Program, Sukhoi/HAL 
(Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd) Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft, and the Multi-Generation 
Fighter Aircraft with Russia.269  
The Russian equipment predominates in the Indian Navy and Indian Army as 
well.270   In sum, while India is happy to accept what the United States sends it in these 
days of rising chumminess, Washington has little hope of seeing the balance of defense 
exports to India tilting in favor of the United States. 
2. Working Together (or not) 
U.S. and Indian understandings of interoperability of forces diverge strikingly. 
According to Dr. Amer Latif, the very term “has negative connotations for the Indian side 
because of perceptions that such concepts connote an alliance-like relationship. India’s 
culture of non-alignment and obsession with ‘strategic autonomy’ preclude it from 
entering into any alliance or exclusive partnership aimed at another country.”271 In the 
context of U.S.-Indian naval exercises, for example, a policy brief notes “New Delhi’s 
political commitment to ‘strategic autonomy’ constricts greater interoperability between 
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the two defense forces these agreements would promote.”272 In sum, the Indians are 
reluctant to commit their forces into combined military operations unless India’s 
immediate interests are threatened.273   
The Indians’ disinclination toward combined operations outside of supporting UN 
Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs) colors every aspect of their defense relationship with 
the United States—and often reads on the U.S. side as if the Indians do not take 
interoperability seriously at any level. According to a U.S. DoD-commissioned study 
from October 2002, obtained by an Indian news source: 
The American military officials are “frustrated” with the “Indian 
unwillingness” to be active participants “in and exchange of ideas.” In fact 
this was reflected in the military briefings before Defense Policy Group 
and Executive Steering Groups—the two forums for military exchange 
between India and U.S. The Indian presentations were described as 
“elementary and pedestrian.” The presentations were either lacking in 
elaboration on Indian strategies, or focusing completely on Pakistan.274 
 Particularly to American officials long experienced with multilateral 
interoperability in such contexts as NATO, such a half-hearted effort means that real 
partnership is stalled at the very beginning. In a word, the new era of U.S.-Indian defense 
cooperation may have found less traction, at least so far, than at least one half of the 
relationship hopes. 
Some of underlying problem is built right into the Indian armed forces. Although 
Indian military thinking at the operational and tactical levels has been exposed to a 
transformation riding on Indian ascendance in information technology, it is still some 
distance away from becoming compatible with U.S. military equipment and practices. 
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The Indian Military Doctrine (IMD), which was issued in 2004, laid the foundation for 
the current Cold Start Doctrine that envisages quick and simultaneous armor thrusts (duly 
supported by their airpower) into Pakistan. In such a strike, India would seek to capitalize 
on the element of surprise to cause strategic paralysis in its adversary.275 Only with the 
2009 review of the IMD have the Indians started to focus on asymmetric and sub-
conventional threats, strategic reach, and out-of-area capabilities and operational synergy 
between the three services.276 (The U.S. military embarked on this path over quarter of a 
century ago after the signing of Goldwater-Nichols Act by President Reagan on October 
1, 1986.277)   
The Indian military is also facing some serious manpower and discipline 
problems, which might hamper its capacity to cooperate with the high-tech and highly 
motivated U.S. military.278 According to leading Indian defense and security analyst 
Brig. R. Gurmeet Kanwal: 
As India’s economy is booming and lucrative career options are available 
to the youth in the private sector, the Indian armed forces are being 
increasingly faced by an acute shortage of officers. The worst affected is 
the Indian army that has a staggering shortage of approximately 13,000 
officers out of an authorized cadre strength of about 40,000 officers. The 
endemic shortage of officers in the armed forces continues to have a 
deleterious effect on their war fighting capability.279    
Those who do wear the uniform face their own difficulties. According to Sidhart 
Srivastava, “Rising incidents of violent face-offs between officers and soldiers in the 
Indian Army are becoming a cause for worry. The reasons relate to harsh service 
conditions, risk to life and limb, low pay, incompetent leadership and a culture of 
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humiliation of enlisted men by their officers.”280 In May 2012, men from an infantry unit 
deployed in the strategic Ladakh region, close to the Chinese border, staged a protest 
march against the unit officers, in the nearby town. It took the intervention and assurance 
of the Corps Commander— a three-star general—to convince the troops to return to their 
unit.281 The Indian Air Force also has a history of disruptive inter-branch rivalry and 
acrimony over discriminatory pay and allowances (especially for pilots) that has led to 
agitation, protests and litigations.282 “Of late it has been observed that indiscipline and 
discontentment in the Armed Forces due to supersession, cases of moral turpitude, scams 
and corruption are at its highest ebb.”283   
3. Organizational/Bureaucratic Obstacles 
The defense bureaucracies in United States and India impede the growth of 
defense cooperation, albeit for different reasons. U.S. defense bureaucracy is tied by the 
complex legislative procedures and stringent arms export regimes. “It is claimed that 
export controls as currently conceived and implemented result in economic impacts 
detrimental to the U.S. defense industrial base, particularly on suppliers of dual use 
technologies, without a concomitant benefit to U.S. national security.”284 The U.S. 
Department of Defense’s control of joint ventures in weapon systems development, even 
with allies, adversely affects defense cooperation, especially among the more skittish 
would-be partners. As an example, despite DoD’s eagerness to provide them information 
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on F-35 Lightning (Joint Strike Fighter),285 the Indians turned to the Russians again for 
their future combat aircraft.  
 The Indian defense bureaucracy is known for its sluggishness owing to its lack of 
exposure to defense decision-making. Although Indian officials express their frustration 
with the Byzantine U.S. bureaucracy,286 the Indian bureaucracy itself is hampered by 
issues of personnel capacity and budgetary constraints. The civilian bureaucracy 
encompasses “generalist” Indian Administrative Services (IAS) officers who run various 
ministries without having any specialization or expertize in their assignments. The same 
holds true for the bureaucracy in the Ministry of Defense (MoD). The near total absence 
of military officials in the MoD, combined with a generalist civil service which has 
considerable decision-making powers, create problems.287 This situation is best explained 
by Dr. Amer Latif: “[There is] a lack of bureaucratic capacity on the Indian side, 
combined with a lack of expertise on security matters.”   
He added: “In the Army, Navy, the Air Force on both sides, there is a hunger; 
there is great desire to seek closer service-to-service relations. But, unfortunately, the 
civilian overseers within the Indian bureaucracy have some reservations.”288 And their 
reservations mean that change will be especially slow in coming to India’s defense 
institutions, including its defense cooperation arrangements. 
4. Civil Nuclear Issues 
India’s passage of legislation restricting U.S. companies’ ability to compete for 
contracts in the civil nuclear sector has angered some U.S. officials, who went to 
tremendous lengths to convince a skeptical international community of the merits of the 
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U.S.-India civil nuclear deal. The expected commercial benefits of the deal would accrue 
to the United States only if New Delhi legalized an internationally compliant civil nuclear 
liability regime. What eventuated instead, however, was an ambiguous law (titled the 
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill and passed by the Indian Parliament in August 
2012) that did not abide by the international legal norms governing the nuclear trade.  
The legislation makes the suppliers of the nuclear equipment and fuel responsible 
—beyond the recourse already available through the courts—for any nuclear accident 
that happens in future. (From India’s perspective, the problem of liability has been 
exacerbated by the Fukushima disaster and anti-nuclear protests that have threatened the 
opening of the Russian-built Kudankulam reactor and development of the site at Jaitapur, 
where the French plan to construct a civil nuclear plant.289) The legislation disappointed 
U.S. policymakers and represented a failure of New Delhi to uphold its end of the civil 
nuclear agreement.290  There is still a lingering sense in U.S. policy circles that 
Washington gained little from the civil nuclear deal. Only time will tell whether U.S. 
companies will benefit from the deal and whether it leads to greater cooperation between 
the two countries in stemming global proliferation.  
5. The Enemies of One’s Friends: Iran and China 
U.S.-India security cooperation will not be affected by the perceptions and 
institutional problems only; respective/divergent positions on two crucial foreign policy 
issues: Iran and China would also cast shadow on it. In fact, some observers have termed 
India-Iran strategic relationship as a stumbling block to the furtherance of U.S.-India 
strategic relations.  
a. The Iran Factor 
Some observers justifiably question the U.S. policy of projecting India as 
its strategic partner despite the fact that the latter continues to maintain broad-based 
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relations with Iran, explicitly strong U.S. reservations on the issue notwithstanding.291 
Meanwhile, the leftist political parties in India, which are coalition partners in the current 
government, have no love lost for the United States. They favor the thriving Indo-Iranian 
strategic partnership and hence bristle at the U.S. pressure on India to curtail its relations 
with Iran. 
And so far, India has nurtured these relations, including defense connections. 
Indo-Iran military ties encompass a wide array of cooperation between the two militaries. 
Indian Army technicians are reported to have helped maintain the Iranian tanks, artillery 
pieces, and infantry fighting vehicles. In the naval domain, there are reports of Iranian 
engineers and missile boat operators being trained in India apart from export of naval 
simulators to Iran. Iran is interested in having its MiG-29 combat planes overhauled or 
upgraded by the Indian aeronautical engineers. India is also reported to have assisted Iran 
in acquiring/employing the nuclear and ballistic missile technology.292  
b. The China Factor 
India’s ambivalence about its relations with China could also affect U.S.-
India relationship.293 To be sure, the Indians have not forgotten their humiliation at the 
hands of Chinese during the 1962 Sino-Indian war, not least because some of the same 
border issues exist even today. China and India are also likely to have a renewed 
competition over the control of Indian Ocean especially between the Straits of Hormuz 
and Malacca, which are vital for their energy and trade interests. The Defense Secretary 
Leon Panetta’s declaration in June 2012 that India was a lynchpin in the U.S. pivot to 
Asia294 indicates that Americans intend to exploit the Indian threat perception about 
China. “On a swing through Asia … Panetta had hoped to bring the Indian defense 
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establishment on board for a rebalancing strategy that many believe is aimed squarely at 
China.”295  
There is a strong lobby in the Indian strategic community that questions 
India’s projection as a strategic hedge against the Chinese threat, especially at the behest 
of the United States. It is felt that India is at least a decade away from attaining the 
military capability to enable it to challenge the Chinese military might. Even if India 
were to achieve that capability in future, Indian defense experts maintain that it would not 
be prudent to position itself against China for commercial interests. China is already a 
major trading partner of India’s.296 The two-way trade between China and India reached 
$74 billion in 2011, with China becoming one of the largest trade partners of India and 
vice versa.297  Both countries agreed to take steps to ensure that their bilateral trade 
reaches $100 billion by 2015.298       
Indians also worry, considering the U.S. track record, that Washington 
will not commit itself openly to support India in case it happened to provoke China.299 
India acknowledges that the U.S. maritime presence in the Asia–Pacific will help check 
the Chinese naval power projection in the Indian Ocean, but it doubts whether India 
would benefit from close ties with the United States. Another concern expressed in this 
regard is: what would happen if U.S.-China relations were to get cordial due to economic 
considerations? According to C. Raja Mohan, “India’s success in balancing Chinese 
power in the region depends squarely on the quality of its relations with the U.S. … At 
the same time, India must reduce its vulnerability to the potential for changing dynamics 
in Sino–U.S. ties.”300 Therefore, India is not likely do the U.S. bidding when it comes to 
countering China. “India doesn’t want to upset China, its main competitor in Asia, by 
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openly embracing the United States … . Indian lawmakers and politicians continue to 
have reservations over the United States … from India’s perception … that Washington 
has tended to side with India’s arch-rival, Pakistan.”301  And so the song remains the 
same. 
6. Prospects for the Future 
Whereas, India sees the United States as a conduit to acquisition of cutting edge 
military technology which it requires to project its power in the region and beyond. In the 
region, it must dissuade Pakistan from pursuing bilateral contentious issues; beyond the 
region, it needs primarily to protect its energy and commercial interests especially in the 
Indian Ocean. India’s quest for enhancing its military might with the assistance of the 
United States is not necessarily aimed at countering Chinese threat, at least in the short 
term. 
U.S-India security relations appear to be quite promising at present, albeit a 
number of impediments including some of those already described above, could act as 
spoilers. Taken individually, those issues may not appear very serious but their combined 
effect might stymie the further growth of relations.302  
Despite all these limitations, the developing strategic partnership between the 
United States and India will grow out of common national interests—defeat of terrorism, 
preventing proliferation, energy security, stability in South Asia, maintaining open sea 
lanes, economic cooperation, and counterbalancing a rising China. The extent to which 
the U.S. and India can cooperate on these issues and others will be tempered by 
international and domestic political realities.303 On India’s persistent demands, the United 
States has vowed to de-hyphenate or delink its relations with India from those with 
Pakistan. This commitment is likely to be seriously tested in post-U.S. withdrawal 
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Afghanistan in which India, despite its reluctance, is being offered an enhanced military 
role.  
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN AND REGIONAL SECURITY 
U.S.-Pakistan security relations have been strained over the last couple of years 
amid divergence over fighting certain terrorist groups (read: Haqqanis) and incidents like 
the killing of Osama bin Laden and the Salala massacre. But just because this relationship 
has hit a road block, it may not be at the end of the road if sincere effort is made to 
remove the obstacles. The prospects need to be assessed based on the ground realities and 
the prospects of U.S-India defense cooperation especially in Afghanistan after the U.S. 
withdrawal.     
1. Fair and Balanced 
Much of what India acquires in terms of enhancing its military capability has a 
direct impact on Pakistan, affecting the security calculus between the two countries. This 
disparity would be further accentuated in case military cooperation between Pakistan and 
the United States declines for some reason. Riding on the wave of modern defense 
technology, Indian armed forces have already devised and practiced in military exercises, 
a highly offensive Cold Start Doctrine.304 This doctrine, based on blitzkrieg-style rapid 
armor thrusts, is clearly Pakistan specific. These developments have already forced 
Pakistan to seek tactical nuclear weapons, which means its enhanced reliance on nuclear 
capability.305    
Any future Indo-Pakistan conflict presents an ominous picture. Exploiting the 
discriminatory provisions of U.S.-India civil nuclear deal, India will be in a position to 
divert the surplus fissile material toward nuclear warheads.306 India also plans to acquire 
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems from countries including the United States. 
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According to Dr. Shireen Mazari, a leading Pakistani security analyst, “If India deploys 
its missile defense shield then it implies that India seeks to move out of the deterrence 
mode into a war-fighting mode in terms of the use of nuclear weapons—that one can 
actually use nuclear weapons in war and prevail militarily.”307 Needless to say, such an 
Indian quest will be highly dangerous in the India-Pakistan context.  
Pakistan will be left with no other option but to boost its inventory of ballistic 
missiles and also seek to develop its own ABM systems, leading to a debilitating arms 
race in the region.308 Pakistan’s recent overtures to Russia and memoranda of 
understanding on defense cooperation especially on air defense prove this point.309 In a 
bid to maintain a regional strategic balance, Pakistan will be forced either to enhance its 
already hefty defense budget or compromise on anti-terrorist operations, which are really 
sapping its material and human resources. The continued outlay of disproportionately 
high resources on defense would mean fewer resources for human development, a recipe 
for Pakistan’s internal instability that would have regional implications.  
2. Pakistan’s Relevance beyond the War on Terror 
The U.S. commitment in Afghanistan is likely to continue in the foreseeable 
future because of the complexity of achieving the objectives of political reforms and 
reconstruction.   Pakistan has a key role in the ongoing war on terror in the border belt 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan and as such contributes directly to the attainment of 
those objectives. An unstable Pakistan could destabilize the entire region, especially U.S. 
objectives in Afghanistan and its growing relationship with India.310 As such an unstable 
Pakistan would not be in U.S. or Indian interests. 
In the short term, the major irritant in U.S.-Pakistan military relations is the U.S. 
feeling that Pakistan is reluctant to take decisive action against the Haqqani network in 
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North Waziristan Agency, which allegedly launches attacks against U.S./ISAF forces in 
Afghanistan.311 The Pakistanis question why U.S./ISAF forces do not target the Haqqanis 
while they venture into Afghanistan. Indeed, most of the Haqqani network has shifted to 
Afghanistan in the wake of relentless drone strikes on their hideouts in the NWA.312 
Similarly, the Pakistani security establishment also complains that despite its pinpointing 
of Pakistani Taliban operating out of north-eastern Afghanistan and attacking Pakistani 
security forces, U.S./ISAF forces have not shown any interest in targeting them.313 How 
ironic that Pakistan is blamed for not taking action against the Afghan Taliban, who pose 
no threat to Pakistan, while U.S./ISAF forces are not ready to target the Pakistani Taliban 
because they register no threat to themselves. In other words, the logic that is acceptable 
for U.S./ISAF forces is not acceptable in case of Pakistan.        
The United States and Pakistan need each other’s cooperation in fighting war 
against terror. The United States requires Pakistan’s cooperation for the endgame in 
Afghanistan. Pakistan also wants a role in the post-withdrawal scenario - both hitting the 
same bull but fail to pick enough signals to implement it. Even after the bulk of 
U.S./ISAF forces move out of Afghanistan, a reasonable number of U.S. forces will still 
be stationed there. To maintain those forces, the United States will continue to need 
Pakistani support in ensuring unhindered flow of logistics through its territory. This 
circumstance calls for maintaining good relations with Pakistan’s security 
establishment.314  
3. Prospects for the Future 
U.S.-Pakistan relations have been sailing on choppy waters over the last two years 
due to unfortunate incidents described in the last chapter. However, what is heartening is 
the fact that, despite the cross-currents and sneaker waves, the relations have been 
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revived primarily by some deft diplomacy. While respecting his academic (not 
diplomatic) credentials, one tends to differ with overly pessimistic views of Mr. Husain 
Haqqani (Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United States) when he writes, “But even 
though Pakistan has continued to depend on U.S. military and economic support, it has 
not changed its behavior much. Each country accuses the other of being a terrible ally – 
and perhaps both are right.”315 To conclude his essay, he adds, “After all, they [U.S.-
Pakistan relations] could hardly be worse off than they are now, clinging to the idea of 
alliance even though neither actually believes in it. Sometimes, the best way forward in a 
relationship lies in admitting that it’s over in its current incarnation.”316  The U.S.-
Pakistan relationship, which is so extensive and more importantly so in tune with the 
strategic objectives of both sides, cannot be sunk so easily. For a long-lasting and 
strategic relationship with Pakistan, the United States needs to allay Pakistani 
apprehensions/sensitivities about the Indian role in Afghanistan; the U.S. stance on 
Pakistan’s nuclear development program, and most importantly, its policy toward India-
Pakistan relations.317  
The challenge for Pakistan is to ensure that it remains relevant to the United 
States on the strategic level. Pakistan must mold the U.S.-Pak relationship in to a more 
strategic partnership. It cannot afford to have India as the only south Asian country 
serving as a strategic partner to the only superpower.  
It would be unfortunate if the U.S.-Pakistan relationship were to remain based on 
such narrow considerations that it can be defined only as a marriage of convenience. 
Provided that this relationship is expanded beyond purely security considerations into 
economic realm, it would benefit the 200 million Pakistanis—a considerable 
enhancement of the human security of the region that would pay great dividends in 
regional peace and stability as well as a burnished reputation for the United States. Such a 
redefinition of relations is not a very tall order considering the immense resources of the 
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world’s sole superpower. Military cooperation, which is the mainstay of this relationship, 
will also get a boost considering the fact that the two militaries have historically been 
closer to each other as compared with any other segment of the two societies.   
4. Pakistan’s Relations with China and Iran 
As India’s growing relations with China and Iran might impact India’s relations 
with the United States, Pakistan’s relations with these two friendly neighbors will 
certainly have a deeper impact on its relations with the United States. Pakistan’s relations 
with both China and Iran are more historical and deep-rooted as compared with India’s 
relations with the two countries. What is even more important to note is that Pakistan’s 
strategic and commercial interests underpinning these relations might, on certain issues, 
come into conflict with those of the United States and even India. In short, these relations 
and associated interests of all the stakeholders present a very complex matrix. 
a. The China Factor      
The most important property of Pak-China friendship that is has been 
rightly termed as “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans” is its 
reliability/durability which is in stark contrast to Pakistan’s friendship with the United 
States. Though Pak-China relationship is multi-dimensional, security cooperation is its 
corner stone. According to a report in Pakistan’s leading newspaper: 
China is Pakistan’s principal source of military supplies. China has 
provided vitally needed technological assistance for Pakistan’s nuclear and 
ballistic missile programs throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Chinese 
military assistance to Pakistan in conventional weapons includes the JF-17 
aircraft, JF-17 production facility, F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 jet 
trainers, T-85 tanks and small arms and ammunition. … the resurgence of 
militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas and their expanding trans-national 
networks may force Pakistan and China to shift their focus and 
concentrate more on joint mechanisms to counter the growing threat of 
terrorism.318   
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 When Pakistan was shunned for its nuclear proliferation and India was 
showered with U.S. nuclear favors, China continued its unwavering support for 
Pakistan’s peaceful nuclear program, which was criticized in the United States—
unfairly—as an ideologically informed move.319   
b. The Iran Factor 
More than the strategic and commercial interests as in case of Pak-China 
relations, Pak-Iran ties are rooted in common religious and cultural grounds. Pak-Iran 
relations that had been very cordial in Shah of Iran’s time got a little strained in the 80s 
and 90s due to growing Sunni-Shia rift in Pakistan in the wake of Shi’ite Islamist 
revolution in Iran that had resulted in the overthrow of the Shah. It coincided with the 
conflicting interests of the two countries in the post-Soviet withdrawal Afghanistan.320 
Despite those irritants, military-military cooperation continued in terms of combined 
training: the author was trained alongside Iranian cadets at Pakistan Air Force Academy, 
in mid-80s. Having presented a mixed picture over the last couple of decades, Pak-Iran 
relations have undergone a tremendous improvement lately. Despite immense U.S. 
pressure and threat of sanctions, Iran and Pakistan inked the historic U.S. $7.5 billion 
deal on the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline recently.321   
This commercial interest might help Iran and Pakistan iron out their 
differences on sectarian issues and future of Afghanistan. India had been interested in the 
pipeline deal for the last few years and hence it was termed as Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI). 
However, India, under the U.S. pressure322 and as a gratitude for the U.S.-India civil 
nuclear deal, opted out of it last year. An interesting (but alarming for the United States) 
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development could be India’s rejoining this joint venture sometime in future. This 
eventuality is in the realm of possibility considering the current state of Indo-Iranian 
relations and especially the way in which Indians conduct their foreign policy.    
C. CONCLUSION 
U.S. relations with Pakistan are going to be a major hurdle in projected progress 
of U.S. relations with India because many Indians still believe that the United States has 
traditionally not been sensitive to Indian reservations about U.S. sponsorship of Pakistani 
military. Any U.S. transactions on one side of the Indo-Pak border cannot be considered 
in a vacuum as they would certainly raise concerns on the other side. Pakistan’s strong 
expression of disappointment over the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal and negative Indian 
reaction over sale of advanced U.S. military equipment to Pakistan, prove this point. This 
triangle of zero-sum relations will strongly come into play as India and especially 
Pakistan have high stakes in post-U.S. withdrawal Afghanistan. India’s likely limited 
military role in Afghanistan will negatively affect U.S.-India military relations.323   
According to Christine Fair, “there is little evidence that regional implications are 
being considered by Washington … it has de-hyphenated its relations with the two major 
South Asian states … While this is certainly to be applauded, in reality, full de-
hyphenation of policy is a rhetorical nicety.”324  The ground reality, however, is that 
prevailing security environment in South Asia owing to acrimony between India and 
Pakistan will continue to challenge U.S. engagement with both countries simultaneously. 
While Pakistan seeks active U.S. role in resolving outstanding Indo-Pakistan disputes, 
India abhors such a proposition. Hence, the security competition between the two nuclear 
armed rivals will continue and U.S.-supported Indian dream of attaining a great power 
status could take much longer time in becoming true. Christine Fair adds, “While these 
considerations may not change the substance of U.S.-India relations, they should inform 
                                                 
 323 John H. Hill, “U.S.–India Military-to-Military Interaction: in the Context of the Larger 
Relationship,”  119. 
324 Christine Fair, “India-Iran Security Ties: Thicker Than Oil,” 300.   
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contingency planning with respect to Pakistan and … motivate some thinking about the 
role of Pakistan’s threat perception in securing regional stability.”325   
  
                                                 
325 Ibid. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION 
Having carried out an in-depth analysis of the comparative history of U.S. 
security cooperation (bordering on human security as well as strategic cooperation) with 
India and Pakistan, the final step is to revisit the major research question. Will the 
growing security cooperation between the United States and India and somewhat 
declining cooperation between the United States and Pakistan serve the medium-long-
term peace and security in South Asia? Although, the answer to this vital question is not 
straight forward, one can safely say that certain straightforward but sustained measures 
by the three stakeholders can achieve the necessary reconfiguration of U.S. relations with 
both South Asian powers.   
A.  UNITED STATES 
U.S. interest in the South Asian region neither commenced with the GWOT, nor it 
is going to end with that. Being the sole superpower, the United States cannot afford to 
simply walk away from the region as it did in late ‘80s—for which it paid/is still paying a 
very heavy price. 
In the past, the U.S. policies towards the individual regional stakeholders have 
had implications for others in the South Asian region. The situation is more acute now 
because most of those stakeholders are either allies or major trading partners of the 
United States, momentary ripples in those relations notwithstanding. Hence, U.S. policy 
makers will be well-advised not to be duped by the enticing terms like “de-hyphenation” 
because they will prove to be no more than a mirage in the South Asian context.  
In this connection, the following recommendations are propounded for 
consideration by the U.S. policy circles:   
1. In the best interest of South Asia, establish broad-based long-term relations with 
the two main stakeholders: India and Pakistan, keeping their mutual sensitivities 
in view. Invest serious diplomatic capital in resolving their long-standing “blood-
feuds” like Kashmir while asking India to step down from its high pedestal of 
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“bilateral resolution of disputes” that it obstinately draws from the Indo-Pak 
Simla Agreement of 1972. 
2. The United States should arm India while remaining cognizant of the possibility 
that it might induce an element of arrogance in Indian attitude, which might 
seriously compromise the regional security paradigm. With India and Pakistan 
locked in endless security competition, a disproportionately large chunk of limited 
resources continuously flows into regional security mechanisms with resources 
dedicated for human security in inverse proportions.  
3. If arming India is a strategic compulsion for the United States, then the 
strengthening of Pakistani military capabilities must also figure out high on the 
U.S. agenda for maintaining strategic balance in the region. 
4. Implementation of civil nuclear deal with India needs to be closely monitored in 
true letter and spirit not only for safeguarding commercial interests of the United 
States but also in the best interest of nuclear non-proliferation. India should not be 
allowed to exploit the loopholes in the deal to divert the fissile material for 
weapon purposes, upsetting the precarious nuclear balance in the region. 
5. The United States should stop losing sleep over the safety and security of 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Explicit and frequent voicing of U.S. concerns 
touches the raw nerve of the Pakistani nation and military, who take immense 
pride in and jealously guard the nuclear capability that has been achieved after 
giving huge sacrifices, virtually “eating grass” in the process. Pakistan has already 
put in place a fool-proof security system for its nuclear infra-structure as well as 
an efficient Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).    
6. Afghanistan, in the near future is likely to witness strategic competition between 
the internal as well as regional and extra-regional stakeholders. The United States 
should get all the Afghan stakeholders especially the Taliban and Northern 
Alliance as well as outside stakeholders like Pakistan, India, China, and even Iran 
on board to broker a power sharing arrangement in Afghanistan. It should avoid 
giving any disproportionate role to India to the detriment of Pakistan.  
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7. Pakistani influence with factions of Taliban, Indian influence with Northern 
Alliance, and Iranian influence in the western Afghanistan could be used to good 
effect while sorting out the Afghan end game. It would be a strategic blunder on 
part of the United States to play favorites in this high stakes game. Giving India 
an unjustifiably large role especially at the cost of Pakistan will neither serve U.S. 
interests nor those of domestic/regional players. 
8. Pakistan is facing a severe energy crisis that has brought its industry and services 
to their knees and created serious social problems due to alarmingly high 
unemployment, especially among the youth. Instead of blocking Pakistan’s 
nuclear energy deals with China and gas deals with Iran, the United States must 
invest as well to encourage others to invest in Pakistan’s energy sector while 
securing its standing to weigh in on these issues as a contributor. 
9. At present, the U.S. approval rating in Pakistan is the lowest ever (around 8 
percent). The United States should invest more into the projects that directly 
benefit the masses. USAID and its positive projection in the Pakistani media is a 
step in the right direction but it needs further expansion. An internally stable and 
prosperous Pakistan would suit everyone in the region and beyond. 
B. INDIA 
As compared with other countries in South Asia, India undoubtedly is a great 
country in terms of its size, human resources, economy, and its military. However, what 
India seriously lacks is moral greatness. It does not enjoy cordial relations with any of its 
neighbors as it has always shied away from resolving mutual issues amicably and instead 
tried to throw its weight around. As the largest and strongest country in South Asia, India 
has had the tendency of interfering in the internal affairs of smaller neighbors and even 
picking squabbles with an eye toward its own territorial aggrandizement. It has territorial 
and water disputes with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, and Nepal. It carried out a 
military intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, which resulted in its separation from West 
Pakistan and made a bloody war much worse. Heady from that success, India intervened 
in Sri Lanka in 1987. It had to ultimately retreat after facing humiliation and losing 1225 
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soldiers—ironically at the hands of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), which 
faction India had sought to support.   
India’s bitter experience in the Sri Lankan misadventure might keep it from 
becoming part of any collaborative security arrangements. India’s refusal to send troops 
to Iraq in 2003 and reluctance to commit troops in Afghanistan now can be attributed to 
the same hard-won hesitancy. Moreover, the Indian attitude has placed most of its 
neighbors: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Nepal firmly into the Chinese 
orbit. It has sought to acquire military muscle to assume the status of a regional bully. 
Even currently, it is trying to make most of the U.S. benevolence to further its regional 
and extra-regional ambitions.  
As a subscriber of hard-core realism, India tends to pursue its own agenda and is 
usually not given to accommodating the interests of other countries even at a slight 
compromise to its own. This attitude served India well as long as Indian ambitions 
focused on being the big kid on the South Asian block, but that approach neither befits 
nor benefits a great power. As such, India will need to seriously consider the following 
policy recommendations in its own interest as well in interest of other countries in the 
region: 
1. India must show some sincerity in resolving its outstanding disputes with 
Pakistan, especially Kashmir. Otherwise some 1.4 billion people in both countries 
will continue to live under the shadow of nuclear holocaust and the foregone 
opportunities the South Asian nuclear contest entails. Hundreds of millions of 
people in India are amongst the poorest in the world. If not for anyone else’s sake, 
at least for the sake of those teeming Indian masses, India should shun its 
belligerence and invest more in human development—and let Pakistan also do the 
same. 
2. India should reject highly aggressive conventional military doctrines like “Cold 
Start” and review its plans to acquire anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. Both 
of these strategies and their attendant capabilities have an ominous potential to 
destabilize South Asia.  
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3. India must realize that despite its embrace of the realist school of thought, there 
still is some room for morality in international relations especially if a country is 
aspiring to become a great power. Countries in that quest have to make certain 
compromises and sacrifices which do not lower their stature. In fact, making 
comprises to amicably resolve the regional disputes, raise it. Indeed, there is no 
way for Indian power to be regionally secure without a proper establishment of 
both its legitimacy and a consensus with Pakistan on the basis of mutual respect 
and accommodation.  
4. For the moment, India might enjoy “returning the favor” of Pakistan’s purported 
hand in the Kashmiri insurgency by fomenting trouble in the restive Pakistani 
province of Baluchistan. But Delhi must remember that lighting a bonfire in your 
neighbor’s backyard might burn your own fingers and its flames might travel to 
your backyard in no time. Wind patterns in this region are mostly westerly: 
blowing from west to east. In other words, what goes around comes around.  
5. India should acknowledge that the Pakistani state is not a sponsor of terrorism. In 
fact, Pakistan is a victim; Pakistan has lost more than 30,000 lives (including 
3,500 security forces personnel) and more than $67 billion in material. Instead of 
continuing to milk the bogey of “Pakistani terrorism” India should extend a 
sincere hand of cooperation in a bid to devise a joint mechanism for fighting the 
scourge of terrorism, which threatens both states and the region.   
6. Although India’s enhanced footprint in Afghanistan might look strategically very 
lucrative, it has the potential of dooming the apparent lull in the Indo-Pak active 
conflict. India should be prudent enough to eschew any activity in Afghanistan 
that could exacerbate Pakistani concerns in that imbroglio. India should strongly 
resist temptation/encouragement to commit itself militarily into Afghanistan as 
that would have disastrous consequences not only for it but also for other internal 
and external stakeholders. 
7. Finally, as a famous saying goes, you can change your friends but not your 
neighbors. Hence, it is better to co-exist peacefully with them but not always on 
 96 
your terms. India should remember that a stable and prosperous Pakistan is in its 
interest, and it should sincerely help realization of that. It would be utterly 
foolhardy on India’s part to think that Pakistan will ultimately capitulate in the 
face of “Rising India”; nuclear powers are not pushovers.             
C. PAKISTAN 
Thanks to the faulty partition plan formulated in 1947 by the British colonists, 
Pakistan gained independence and an acute shortage of material and military resources 
vis-à-vis India. This comparative disadvantage naturally gave birth to Pakistan’s deep 
sense of insecurity, and the Indian attitude since independence has exacerbated it in no 
small measure. Being an ideological state, Pakistan, which should have ideally evolved 
into a welfare state, drifted into becoming a security state.  
Periodic U.S. military assistance helped assuage Pakistani security anxieties but 
U.S.-Pakistan relationship never moved much beyond that and failed to mature into a 
broad-based people-to-people engagement. This relationship enhanced Pakistan’s 
military potential but not as much, the other elements of national power potential. 
Perhaps that explains the episodic nature of U.S.-Pakistan security cooperation.   
If U.S.-Pakistan relations have been “consistently inconsistent,” Indo-Pak 
relations have been “consistently acrimonious.” A crucial thing to note here is that these 
two sets of relations are fundamentally inter-linked. Pakistan, materially the weakest side 
of this triangle, needs to play its cards really well not only to survive at present but also to 
thrive in future. The following recommendations are propounded for consideration by 
Pakistani policy makers:     
1. Pakistan should proactively seek to resolve all of its outstanding disputes with 
India and insist on facilitation by such neutral powers as the United States and 
possibly EU. It should remind India that if India can ignore the 1948 U.N. 
resolutions on plebiscite in Kashmir, then the Indo-Pak commitment to resolve all 
issues bilaterally under the Simla Agreement can also be set aside for a while to 
break out of current impasse by accepting external facilitation. 
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2. Until a shift in the Indian attitude toward the acceptance of U.S./ EU facilitation 
comes about, Pakistan should not lower its guard. It should continue to hone its 
conventional military capability, backed up by a credible nuclear deterrence. 
Learning from India, Pakistan should also expand its support base. Recent 
politico-military overtures to Russia, which met with positive response, must be 
pursued further without compromising on its relations with the United States. The 
aim should be to diversify Pakistan’s supporters so as to ease the burdens of 
alliance and expectations. 
3. Considering the current state of the Pakistani economy, Pakistan can ill-afford to 
get into any type of arms race with India. Instead what it needs to do is to 
resolutely enhance its tooth-to-tail ratio: prefer fewer but more effective weapon 
systems. It might not economize resources in the short-term; however, in the 
medium to long term, it will. The savings should be voluntarily surrendered for 
human development at the national level. 
4. Pakistan must realize once and for all that its strategic compulsions 
notwithstanding, it direly needs to be seen as a responsible, progressive, and 
vibrant member of the international community. In order to achieve this 
refurbished image, it needs to make a serious investment in development of its 
abundant human capital. It should seek to enhance other elements of its national 
power alongside its military power because there is no bigger virtue than being 
strong and no bigger vice than being weak.        
5. Pakistan must continue to show its resolve in curbing nuclear proliferation and 
fighting terrorism. It should convince the United States and EU that it is a 
responsible nuclear state which has robust and foolproof nuclear 
command/control/security systems in place. Hence, apprehensions about its 
nuclear weapons/materials falling into the hands of terrorists are entirely 
misplaced. Pakistan’s anti-terrorism campaign and sacrifices rendered therein 
must be aggressively projected in the world media.  
6. Pakistan should take an active part in parleys concerning the future of 
Afghanistan and facilitate in getting all the domestic Afghan and regional 
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stakeholders, including Iran on board. It should not compromise on its strategic 
interests while being cognizant of the emerging ground realities concerning its 
western neighborhood. Its relative economic weakness might not allow it to 
partake in Afghan reconstruction on the scale that some of other stakeholders 
might be in a position to do. However, Pakistan should offer training to Afghan 
security forces and share its surplus resources for their capacity building. 
Moreover, it should offer educational facilities to Afghan youth in Pakistani 
institutions. 
7. Capitalizing on its unique status of being a strategic ally of the United States and 
China, Pakistan should repeat its diplomatic act of 1971 of getting both states 
closer. Rapprochement instead of rancor between the United States and China will 
bring rich dividends, both strategic and economic, to the moonstruck region that is 
South Asia. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The foundations of U.S. security cooperation with Pakistan and India have 
transformed from the Cold War imperatives to the GWOT and finally to counter the 
imminent rise of China as an Asian great power if not the world power. Although these 
relations have been primarily based on security considerations, they have failed to 
address the security concerns of the two major stakeholders: India and Pakistan. The 
main reason for that has been the U.S. reluctance to get entangled in Indo-Pak conflict. It 
is ironic; however, that despite this U.S. policy, its engagement with India and Pakistan 
has only exacerbated their bilateral conflict. During the Cold War, United States’ moral 
and material support emboldened Pakistan to confront its much larger neighbor. Now that 
Pakistan is losing favor with the United States, India is gaining same kind of 
encouragement from the sole Super Power to sideline Pakistan and confront China which 
it might never do. 
Narrow security-centered definition of U.S. relations with India and Pakistan has 
resulted in U.S. engagement mostly with the establishments in the two countries and 
minimal interaction with the public. As a result, a vital element of security: human 
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security has been ignored which has greatly contributed to the menace of terrorism 
emanating from the region. Terrorism has not only altered the American way of life and 
badly shaken the U.S. economy but has also further degraded the already abysmal human 
development in South Asia.  
If contentious issues between India and Pakistan had been resolved through a 
process of facilitation, if not outright arbitration, likely neither state would have to 
dedicate so many resources for defense. In the case of Pakistan, security, especially from 
India, has been an outright compulsion and a bigger dilemma considering Pakistan’s 
relatively limited resources. Pakistan’s acute sense of insecurity vis-à-vis India might not 
have motivated it to adopt the resource-intensive course of nuclear weapons—though 
India might have still gone that way citing Chinese threat. The two countries might have 
been in a position to divert more resources toward human development and resultantly, 
the region would not be confronted with this scourge of terrorism.  
With this backdrop, when one looks at the future in light of the current trends of 
U.S. relations with India and Pakistan and imminent U.S. exit from Afghanistan, a mixed 
picture emerges. Going by the historical precedence and current trends, U.S.-India 
security relations are not likely to flourish in a significant way in the near future, nor are 
U.S.-Pakistan relations likely to undergo any major transformation for the better. If U.S.-
India relations develop the way they are being projected by the two sides, especially if 
that means exclusion of Pakistan from the equation, it will have serious ramifications for 
the security and strategic stability in the region. As recommended above, certain bold, 
straightforward, and sustained measures by the three stakeholders can achieve the 
necessary reconfiguration of U.S. relations with both South Asian powers keeping the 
security (including human security) and stability in the region as the ultimate objective. 
Needless to say that the main issue of South Asia—which houses one-fifth of the 
humanity—is not military security but human security, which has direct impact on all 
other forms of security.   
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